Strict insolvency limitation bars exclusion of belated writ-petition time, even where writ relief is declined for alternate remedy.

Under the insolvency statute's strict limitation framework, time spent prosecuting writ petitions in the High Court after expiry of the statutory appeal period could not be excluded when computing limitation for the appeals. The special code did not treat such writ proceedings as a recognised basis for enlarging time, so the appeals remained barred. The High Court, having declined writ interference because an effective statutory remedy was available, could not also direct exclusion of that period for limitation purposes in the appellate forum. The special statute prevailed over any general writ-based relaxation, and the limitation scheme could not be altered through such directions.

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Issues: (i) Whether the period spent in prosecuting writ petitions before the High Court could be excluded for computing limitation for the appeals under the insolvency law. (ii) Whether the High Court, while declining to interfere on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy, could direct exclusion of that period for limitation purposes.

Issue (i): Whether the period spent in prosecuting writ petitions before the High Court could be excluded for computing limitation for the appeals under the insolvency law.

Analysis: The limitation prescribed for filing the appeals under the insolvency framework is strict and time-bound. The appellants approached the High Court only after expiry of the initial statutory period, and the writ petitions were not a statutorily recognised basis for extending limitation. Time spent in a writ proceeding filed beyond the prescribed appeal period could not be treated as excluded time for computing limitation under the special code.

Conclusion: The period spent in the writ petitions could not be excluded, and the appeals remained time-barred.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court, while declining to interfere on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy, could direct exclusion of that period for limitation purposes.

Analysis: Once the High Court declined writ interference because an effective appellate remedy existed under the special statute, it could not simultaneously issue a direction that effectively governed limitation in the appellate forum. The order was beyond the High Court's authority in the context of a special statutory remedy, and the Tribunal treated the issue as governed by the special code rather than by general writ-based relaxation. The rule applied was that the special statute prevails over the general law and the writ forum cannot override the statutory limitation scheme where the proceeding is otherwise not maintainable.

Conclusion: The High Court could not direct exclusion of the period or extend the limitation position for the appeals.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were held to be barred by limitation and were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings governed by a special insolvency statute with a defined limitation period, time spent in an impermissible or belated writ challenge cannot be excluded to enlarge limitation, and a writ court that declines interference for availability of an alternative statutory remedy cannot confer a limitation benefit inconsistent with the special statute.

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