Confiscation under CGST ends detention remedy; post-confiscation relief must follow Section 130 appellate route, not a writ.

Once a confiscation order vests title to goods and conveyance in the State, the detention/seizure remedy under Section 129 ceases and adjudication of valuation, tax, penalty, interest and fine proceeds exclusively under the confiscation regime; post confiscation release must be sought through the statutory appellate channel applicable to confiscation, not by a writ attacking only the earlier detention order. The High Court's Single Judge direction to release subject to deposit and bank guarantee was unsustainable; the appeal was allowed and that release direction set aside in favour of the revenue.

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Issues: (i) Whether, after an order of confiscation under Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 vesting title to goods and conveyance in the State, a writ petition challenging only the earlier detention order under Section 129 of the Act is maintainable and whether the High Court was justified in directing release of the goods subject to deposit and bank guarantee.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme of Sections 129 and 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Section 129 empowers detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit and contemplates conclusion of detention proceedings on payment of amounts quantified under that section. Section 130 empowers confiscation of goods and conveyances and, by sub-section (5), vests title in the Government once confiscation is ordered. On a conjoint reading, once an order under Section 130 is passed and title vests in the State, the remedial mechanism under Section 129 ceases to be available and adjudication as to valuation, tax, penalty, interest and fine is governed exclusively by Section 130 and the appellate remedy provided thereunder. The Court observed that the statutory appeal under Section 107, including its interim arrangement under sub-section (6), is the appropriate channel for seeking release after confiscation and that a writ petition attacking only the earlier Section 129 order, without challenging the Section 130 order, effectively modifies the effect of confiscation and usurps the statutory appellate mechanism.

Conclusion: The writ petition challenging only the order under Section 129 was not maintainable after an order of confiscation under Section 130 had vested title in the Government; the direction of the Single Judge to release the goods subject to deposit and bank guarantee was unsustainable. The appeal is allowed and the High Court order is set aside. This conclusion is against the respondent and in favour of the Revenue.

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