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Issues: (i) whether a claim of reverse passing off is maintainable in trade mark law and whether the facts disclosed passing off or reverse passing off; (ii) whether the respondents' sale and import of end-of-life HDDs amounted to infringement, and whether Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were attracted.
Issue (i): whether a claim of reverse passing off is maintainable in trade mark law and whether the facts disclosed passing off or reverse passing off.
Analysis: The statutory saving for passing off protects only an action against a person passing off his own goods or services as those of another. The concept of reverse passing off, namely misrepresenting another's goods as one's own, does not fit within that framework. Even assuming such a claim were available, the appellants failed to show at the initial point of sale that consumers would identify the refurbished HDDs as theirs despite the respondents' rebranding. There was no prima facie material of misappropriation of goodwill or of damage caused to that goodwill. Mere assertions that technical tools might later reveal the original manufacturer were insufficient at the interlocutory stage.
Conclusion: No maintainable claim of reverse passing off was made out, and no prima facie case of passing off was established.
Issue (ii): whether the respondents' sale and import of end-of-life HDDs amounted to infringement, and whether Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were attracted.
Analysis: Infringement under Section 29 requires use of the registered mark or a deceptively similar mark in the course of trade. Once the appellants' marks were effaced before resale, the respondents were not using the appellants' marks in the impugned sale. Section 30(3) is not a separate source of infringement but an exception that preserves lawful resale of goods bearing a registered mark when lawfully acquired. The goods had been lawfully acquired, there was no shown prohibition on resale by the OEMs after end-of-life, and the import was not shown to be unlawful. Section 30(4) also did not apply, because the alteration undertaken by the respondents did not amount, on the material before the Court, to a change or impairment giving the appellants a legitimate reason to oppose further dealings. The expression "changed" was construed noscitur a sociis with "impaired", and no prima facie prejudice to the appellants' goodwill was shown.
Conclusion: No prima facie infringement was established, and the respondents were entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) while Section 30(4) was inapplicable.
Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed because the respondents' conduct did not disclose a prima facie cause of action for passing off, reverse passing off, or trademark infringement on the materials placed before the Court, and the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge was not disturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: For refurbished second-hand goods, trademark infringement is not made out merely because the original mark is removed and the goods are resold under a different brand; the plaintiff must still establish use of its mark within Section 29, and Sections 30(3) and 30(4) operate only within that framework, with Section 30(4) requiring a legitimate reason based on change or impairment that prejudices the proprietor's goodwill.