Issues: (i) Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt; (ii) Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: Admission of the signature on the cheque attracted the mandatory presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt or liability. The complainant established compliance with the requirements for dishonour of cheque, including timely presentation, demand notice and non-payment. The defence that a blank cheque had been furnished as security for a different loan lacked supporting contemporaneous evidence; the later notice demanding return of the cheque was treated as an afterthought. The complainant's evidence concerning the loan and financial assistance received from others remained credible after cross-examination. Financial incapacity was not established merely from the complainant's monthly income, particularly when evidence showed other investments and financial assistance. The accused had neither replied to the demand notice raising that defence nor adduced cogent material to displace the presumptions.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the presumptions or disprove the legally enforceable debt; the conviction for dishonour of cheque was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction. Concurrent factual findings may be disturbed only where they are perverse, grossly erroneous, based on irrelevant or no material, or result from non-consideration of relevant material or arbitrary exercise of discretion. The High Court substituted its own assessment of the evidence without identifying any such defect in the concurrent findings.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in reversing the concurrent conviction.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings sustaining criminal liability for dishonour of cheque stand restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and discharge of liability operate unless displaced by cogent evidence; a revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence to overturn concurrent findings absent perversity or a jurisdictional defect.

Issues: Whether the assessee-employer was liable to deduct tax at source on leave travel concession payments where employees' journeys involved a foreign leg.

Analysis: Leave travel concession exemption is confined to travel within India under Section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Supreme Court decision applied by the Tribunal establishes that a journey involving a foreign leg is not travel within India, irrespective of the domestic starting and destination points or reimbursement being restricted to the shortest domestic route. The employer, having complete travel details while settling claims, was required to estimate taxable income and deduct tax under Section 192(1). The pending proceedings concerning the bank's internal circulars did not displace this binding determination, though the appellate directions concerning recovery were retained pending the final outcome of the related Supreme Court proceeding.

Conclusion: The assessee was liable for tax deduction at source on leave travel concession payments for journeys involving a foreign leg; the appellate order remains subject to the final outcome in the pending Supreme Court proceeding.

Issues: Whether addition for the difference between the purchase consideration and stamp-duty valuation of immovable property could be made where the purchase agreement and cheque payment preceded the coming into force of Section 56(2)(vii)(b).

Analysis: The agreement for purchase was executed on 16.05.2010 for the agreed consideration, and advance payment was made through cheque and supported by receipts and bank records. The provision invoked for taxing the difference in stamp-duty value was held not to operate retrospectively against an agreement entered before its introduction. The conditions concerning adoption of the stamp-duty value on the agreement date were also satisfied because part consideration had been paid through banking channels before the agreement date.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequently introduced charging provision cannot be applied retrospectively to an immovable-property purchase agreement executed before its commencement, particularly where consideration was paid through banking channels under that agreement.

Issues: (i) Whether the project office of an affiliated entity constituted a fixed place permanent establishment or dependent agent permanent establishment of the assessee in India; (ii) Whether receipts from offshore supply of equipment and offshore repair and refurbishment were taxable in India, including whether the offshore and onshore agreements were artificially split.

Issue (i): Whether the project office of an affiliated entity constituted a fixed place permanent establishment or dependent agent permanent establishment of the assessee in India.

Analysis: The Revenue bore the burden of establishing the conditions for a permanent establishment under Article 5. The service agreement relied upon was between the customer and the affiliated entity, was signed by its project director in that entity's capacity, and contained no authority from the assessee or reference showing that the project office was at the assessee's disposal. No evidence established that the office was used for the assessee's business, that it maintained the assessee's goods, or that it habitually exercised authority to conclude contracts or secure orders for the assessee. The facts were materially consistent with earlier years in which no permanent establishment was found.

Conclusion: The assessee had neither a fixed place permanent establishment nor a dependent agent permanent establishment in India. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from offshore supply of equipment and offshore repair and refurbishment were taxable in India, including whether the offshore and onshore agreements were artificially split.

Analysis: The bid documents and agreements showed separate onshore and offshore arrangements from the bid stage. Under the offshore agreements, supplies and repairs were performed outside India, and title to the equipment passed outside India upon export. The Revenue did not establish that the separation of contracts was artificial. As the offshore transactions were concluded outside India and the assessee had no Indian permanent establishment, the receipts lacked a taxable nexus with India under the treaty.

Conclusion: Receipts from the offshore supplies, repairs and refurbishment were not taxable in India, and no profit could be attributed to an alleged Indian permanent establishment. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessed addition relating to offshore receipts and attribution of profit to an alleged Indian presence cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign enterprise cannot be treated as having a permanent establishment merely because an affiliated entity maintains an Indian office; the Revenue must prove that the treaty conditions for a fixed place or dependent agent permanent establishment are independently satisfied, and offshore receipts from transactions concluded outside India are not taxable absent an Indian taxable nexus.

Issues: Whether the difference between the stamp-duty value and purchase consideration of immovable property was taxable in the hands of the HUF under section 56(2)(vii)(b), and whether the first appellate authority relied on additional evidence in violation of Rule 46A.

Analysis: The sale deed and sale agreement had already been furnished during reassessment, and the first appellate authority merely evaluated that existing material; consequently, there was no prohibited admission of fresh additional evidence. The sale agreement, patta and encumbrance certificate established that the property was acquired by the Karta in his individual capacity. The Revenue produced no cogent material showing that the HUF funded the purchase or that the property was an HUF asset. The inadvertent mention of the HUF PAN in the sale deed, without more, could not establish HUF ownership.

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was not attracted in the hands of the HUF, and deletion of the addition was sustained. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the cash deposits during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained investment; (ii) Whether the enhanced rate of tax under the amended provision for unexplained income applied to cash deposits made before the amendment's effective date.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposits during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained investment.

Analysis: The assessee's explanation that the deposits represented accumulated salary savings was supported only by self-prepared financial statements. There was no contemporaneous evidence of the asserted cash availability, and bank records did not show withdrawals commensurate with the claimed cash balance. The subsequent transfer of the deposited amount to a company connected with the assessee's husband, without supporting documentation, further failed the test of human probabilities. No evidence established that the husband's income had been transferred to the assessee.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were rightly treated as unexplained investment, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the enhanced rate of tax under the amended provision for unexplained income applied to cash deposits made before the amendment's effective date.

Analysis: The deposits were made in November 2016, before 1 April 2017. The enhanced rate introduced by the amendment was prospective and could not govern transactions occurring before its effective date.

Conclusion: The enhanced rate of tax under the amended provision was inapplicable to the impugned addition, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition remains sustainable, but tax must be computed under the law applicable on the date of the deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: An enhanced tax rate introduced prospectively cannot be applied to unexplained-income transactions completed before the amendment became effective.

Issues: Whether compensation paid by a co-producer and director to settle litigation arising from a film-production project was deductible as business expenditure despite having been claimed as bad debts in the return.

Analysis: The payment arose from the assessee's professional role as co-producer and director, obligations connected with timely completion of the project, and commercial litigation in which the assessee was personally impleaded. Consent terms and subsequent judicial directions for payment established that the liability had crystallised and was commercially connected with the professional activity. The deduction depended on the true substance of the expenditure, not its erroneous description as bad debt in the return. The absence of direct contractual privity under the later memorandum, the earlier denial of liability, lack of income from the recipient, and relationship with a partner of the production concern did not displace the professional nexus of the payment.

Conclusion: The compensation of Rs. 3 crore was allowable as business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the alleged erroneous inclusion of capital receipts while allowing only revenue expenditure in computing taxable income after denial of exemption constitutes a mistake apparent from the record rectifiable under section 154.

Analysis: Rectification is confined to an obvious, patent and self-evident error and cannot be used for a matter requiring verification, examination of facts, interpretation of law, or a process of reasoning on which more than one view is possible. Determining the nature and treatment of receipts, allowability of expenditure, and the proper computation of income after denial of exemption requires substantive adjudication. The same computation controversy was also pending in the quantum appeal and could not be reopened through rectification proceedings.

Conclusion: The alleged computational error is not a mistake apparent from the record and is not rectifiable under section 154; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Rectification jurisdiction cannot be invoked to decide disputed questions concerning income computation that require factual verification, legal interpretation, or detailed reasoning.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued for Assessment Year 2015-16 after 1 April 2021 was barred by limitation and consequently deprived the Assessing Officer of jurisdiction to make the reassessment.

Analysis: The binding position applicable to Assessment Year 2015-16 required all reassessment notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 to be dropped, as they could not be completed within the period prescribed under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The notice under section 148 was issued on 31 March 2022. It was therefore time-barred, without authority of law and incapable of conferring jurisdiction for reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid and the assessment founded upon it was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory bar on CESTAT appeals concerning payment of drawback extends to a claim for interest on delayed payment of sanctioned drawback under Section 75A of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether interest on delayed drawback accrues one month after the Let Export Order, or only after adjudicatory proceedings concerning drawback attain finality.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory bar on CESTAT appeals concerning payment of drawback extends to a claim for interest on delayed payment of sanctioned drawback under Section 75A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 129A(1) excludes CESTAT jurisdiction only for disputes relating to payment of drawback under Chapter X of the Customs Act, 1962 and the rules thereunder. A restrictive proviso to a statutory appellate right must be strictly construed and cannot be enlarged by implication. A claim for interest under Section 75A is founded on a separate statutory liability arising from delay in disbursement after drawback becomes payable; it is distinct from adjudication of entitlement to, or quantum of, drawback.

Conclusion: The CESTAT had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal concerning interest on delayed drawback; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on delayed drawback accrues one month after the Let Export Order, or only after adjudicatory proceedings concerning drawback attain finality.

Analysis: Rule 13 of the Customs, Central Excise Duties and Service Tax Drawback Rules, 1995 deems the shipping bill to be the drawback claim on the date of the order permitting export. Section 75A links interest to non-payment within one month from filing of the claim and does not defer accrual until completion of adjudication. Pending proceedings challenging the claim do not displace the statutory deeming of the claim date. Where the proceedings ultimately establish the exporter's entitlement, subsequent sanction gives effect to that entitlement rather than creating a fresh entitlement. Construing the provisions otherwise would permit indefinite postponement of compensatory interest through prolonged proceedings.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 75A accrued after expiry of one month from the Let Export Order dated 13.03.2003 until actual payment of the sanctioned drawback; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory appellate remedy remains available for a delayed-drawback interest claim, and the exporter receives interest calculated from the deemed date of filing under the drawback rules.

Ratio Decidendi: A jurisdictional exclusion concerning payment of drawback cannot be extended to a distinct statutory claim for interest on delayed disbursement, and statutory interest accrues from the deemed filing date fixed by the drawback rules unless the legislation expressly provides otherwise.

Issues: (i) Whether service of the injunction application with the plaint annexed, but without separate service of the plaint and its annexures, complied with Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether the plaintiff had and disclosed a cause of action concerning the alleged provident-fund deficit or defalcation; (iii) Whether the Provident Fund statutory regime barred the civil suit; (iv) Whether the suit was liable to fail for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties; (v) Whether the ex parte injunction was obtained by material suppression; and (vi) Whether the SFIO investigation could continue.

Analysis: The Court found substantial compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 because the application served upon the contesting defendants included the plaint, while the plaint annexures were separately included with corresponding pleadings in the application. The defendants were able to contest the matter fully and had not sought a complete set before advancing their objections. Delay in service did not warrant vacating the injunction where service was effected before the returnable date.

Analysis: The plaint prima facie disclosed a cause of action. The plaintiff, as the exempted establishment responsible for statutory provident-fund contributions, could be required to account for any deficit notwithstanding that the trust was separately constituted. The defendants had not produced cogent material concerning the trust accounts for the relevant later financial years to dislodge the prima facie allegation of defalcation. The exclusion of provident-fund dues from the resolution plan also did not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing the alleged deficit.

Analysis: The powers of the Provident Fund authorities under the statutory scheme did not oust the civil court's jurisdiction over the alleged defalcation. Nor did the absence of every trustee as a party justify, at the interim stage, treating the suit as barred, where specific allegations were pleaded against the impleaded trustees.

Analysis: There was no material suppression concerning the police complaint or FIR, as the complaint was lodged after verification and filing of the plaint and the FIR was registered after the initial injunction. In any event, parallel civil recovery proceedings and criminal investigation could continue because criminal proceedings would not by themselves secure recovery of the allegedly misappropriated funds.

Analysis: Given the pan-India operations, multiple regional provident-fund jurisdictions, and allegations involving statutory employee contributions reflected in the company's accounts, SFIO was considered an appropriate agency for investigation. The Court's power to direct such investigation was not curtailed by Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013, and the alleged defalcation was sufficiently connected with the affairs of the exempted establishment.

Outcome: The applications seeking vacation of the ad interim order were dismissed; the interim protection and SFIO investigation were continued pending adjudication of the injunction application on affidavits.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on outward transportation services received before 01.04.2008 for delivery of final products to customers under FOR destination contracts.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, as applicable before 01.04.2008, covered services used directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture and clearance of final products from the place of removal, and included activities relating to business. The pre-amendment definition was not to be construed restrictively as confined to the factory or depot. Under FOR destination contracts, the supplier remained responsible for delivery and retained ownership until the goods reached the buyer's premises. Admissibility of credit on outward transportation did not depend upon freight forming part of the transaction value for excise-duty purposes.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on goods transport agency service for outward transportation up to the buyers' premises was admissible to the assessee for the period before 01.04.2008.

Issues: Whether a consolidated demand-cum-show cause notice covering multiple financial years may be issued under Sections 73 or 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: There is no statutory bar against issuance of a consolidated show cause notice for different financial years under either Section 73 or Section 74. Whether the proceedings should factually fall under Section 73 or Section 74 depends on the existence of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, requiring adjudication by the Proper Officer and, thereafter, the statutory appellate forums.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years under Sections 73 or 74 is valid; the objection to such jurisdiction fails.

Issues: Whether the petitioner may seek payment of its admitted tax liability in instalments.

Analysis: The petitioner did not dispute the liability and sought time to pay it in instalments. The statutory power to permit instalment payment lies with the Commissioner of State Tax. As no application seeking such relief was placed before the competent authority, the petitioner was directed to make an application for consideration in accordance with law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to apply to the competent authority for instalment payment.

Issues: (i) Whether a company purchasing property in its own name from its recorded corpus can be treated as a benamidar under the statutory definition; (ii) Whether acceptance of the relevant investment under income-tax assessment precludes or must be considered in benami proceedings; (iii) Whether benami findings substantially founded on a retracted third-party search statement can stand without cross-examination and without entity-specific consideration of the recorded source of funds.

Issue (i): Whether a company purchasing property in its own name from its recorded corpus can be treated as a benamidar under the statutory definition.

Analysis: Section 2(9)(A) requires affirmative proof that another person provided the consideration and that the property is held for that person's immediate or future benefit. Corporate status does not immunise a company from being a benamidar. The initial and continuing burden remains on the Initiating Officer to establish the statutory conditions through credible material; a source-of-source inquiry permits investigation but not presumption or reversal of that burden.

Conclusion: A company may be a benamidar if the statutory conditions and the relevant indicia of a benami transaction are established; its corporate character and recorded ownership alone are not conclusive.

Issue (ii): Whether acceptance of the relevant investment under income-tax assessment precludes or must be considered in benami proceedings.

Analysis: Section 69 addresses unrecorded and unexplained investment, whereas Section 2(9)(A) concerns real ownership and beneficial enjoyment. Therefore, the two enactments operate independently and an assessment finding does not automatically determine benami ownership. However, the subsequent assessment specifically accepted the same investment, banking trail, loans and advances as explained. That finding had material evidentiary bearing on the alleged routing of unexplained funds and required consideration by the benami authority.

Conclusion: Acceptance under Section 69 does not bar benami proceedings, but the assessment findings must be considered when determining whether the statutory ingredients of a benami transaction are proved.

Issue (iii): Whether benami findings substantially founded on a retracted third-party search statement can stand without cross-examination and without entity-specific consideration of the recorded source of funds.

Analysis: The alleged cash routing rested substantially on the retracted statement of a third party recorded in income-tax search proceedings. No effective opportunity was given to test that foundational statement by cross-examination, despite a specific request. No independent money trail, cash deposit, or financial instrument was identified linking the alleged beneficial owner's funds to the properties. Further, the authorities did not deal with the documented explanation that the company's reserves pre-dated the alleged beneficial owner's entry and that the purchases were funded by redeployment of loans and advances. In proceedings carrying confiscatory and penal consequences, a foundational and retracted statement cannot support an adverse finding without a fair opportunity to test it and meaningful examination of the material explanation.

Conclusion: The findings were vitiated by breach of natural justice and by failure to examine material evidence concerning the source and vintage of the funds; a fresh fact-finding exercise is required.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for establishing benami ownership remain open for determination upon a lawful reconsideration of the assessment findings, the source explanation, and any reliance on the retracted statement after affording the required procedural safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted third-party statement that forms the foundational basis of a benami finding cannot be relied upon without affording a meaningful opportunity of cross-examination, particularly where independent evidence does not establish the consideration-provider and beneficial ownership required by Section 2(9)(A).

Issues: Whether the pending representations seeking provisional release of seized imported goods and seized currency should be considered and decided by the proper customs officer.

Analysis: The representations for provisional release remained pending before the proper officer. The respondents accepted that they would be decided in accordance with law. No merits of the seizure, release claim, or challenge to the subsequent seizure memorandum were adjudicated. The petitioner was permitted to supplement the pending representation, was entitled to advance notice and an opportunity of hearing, and the proper officer was directed to issue a reasoned decision within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The proper officer must hear and decide the representations for provisional release by a reasoned order within three weeks; the merits of the parties' rival contentions remain open.

Issues: (i) Whether dilution of duty-paid styrene butadiene latex with water, addition of preservative, and repacking under different brand names amounted to manufacture; (ii) Whether the Department could adopt a contrary position for subsequent periods after accepting that the same process did not amount to manufacture for earlier periods.

Issue (i): Whether dilution of duty-paid styrene butadiene latex with water, addition of preservative, and repacking under different brand names amounted to manufacture.

Analysis: Under Section 2(f), manufacture requires transformation resulting in a new and distinct article having a distinct name, character or use. The test material showed that the input latex and the diluted, preservative-added products had the same chemical characteristics. Their uses remained akin, and dilution, branding and repacking did not bring into existence a commercially distinct product. The prior adjudication and Tribunal decisions concerning the same products and process had also reached this conclusion.

Conclusion: The process did not amount to manufacture and no fresh central excise duty was chargeable on the resultant products. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could adopt a contrary position for subsequent periods after accepting that the same process did not amount to manufacture for earlier periods.

Analysis: The earlier Tribunal decisions concerning the assessee and its other unit had attained finality because they were not challenged. Those decisions had conclusively found that the identical process did not result in manufacture. No material distinction or new evidence justified departure from that accepted position for the subsequent period.

Conclusion: The Department could not take a contrary view for the subsequent periods on the same facts and issue. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order dropping the excise-duty proceedings was sustained because the processing did not create a new excisable product and the previously accepted legal position remained binding for identical subsequent transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere dilution, addition of preservative, branding and repacking of duty-paid goods do not constitute manufacture unless they result in a new article with a distinct name, character or use; the Department cannot depart from an unchallenged settled position on identical facts for another period.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in prosecution for alleged fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The investigation had concluded and the complaint had been filed; no criminal antecedents, likelihood of absconding, witness intimidation, or evidence tampering was established. The alleged offences are triable by a Magistrate and carry a maximum imprisonment of five years. Continued pre-trial detention, where the trial was not likely to conclude within a reasonable period, was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, personal liberty, and the principle that bail is the rule while jail is an exception. The documentary and electronic nature of the evidence also reduced the apprehension of interference with the prosecution.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail, subject to conditions securing attendance at trial and protecting the evidence and witnesses.