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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the assessment proceedings initiated under section 153C for the relevant assessment year are barred by limitation in view of the date of handing over of seized material and the legal position that such date constitutes the "year of search" for a person other than the searched person.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Limitation for initiation of proceedings under section 153C
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined section 153C read with the 4th proviso to section 153A in the context of assessment of a person other than the person searched, and considered the binding effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the jurisdictional High Court laying down that the "year of search" for such other person is to be reckoned with reference to the date of handing over of seized documents/material by the Assessing Officer of the searched person to the Assessing Officer of the other person.
2.2 The Court relied on the pronouncement that, for purposes of determining the block period of six assessment years under section 153C, the relevant previous year is that in which the seized material is handed over to the Assessing Officer of the person other than the searched person.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was undisputed that a search was conducted on the third party (A-Tek Enterprises) on 28.06.2018 and that the documents pertaining to the assessee were handed over by the Assessing Officer of the searched person to the Assessing Officer of the assessee on 26.10.2021.
2.4 The Assessing Officer treated the year of search in the case of the searched person (A.Y. 2019-20) as the starting point and computed the block of six assessment years as A.Ys. 2019-20 to 2013-14, thereby including A.Y. 2014-15 within the block.
2.5 The assessee contended that, applying the law declared by the Supreme Court and the High Court, the date of handing over of documents, i.e., 26.10.2021, falls in A.Y. 2022-23, which must be regarded as the "year of search" for the assessee for the purposes of section 153C, and, consequently, the block of six assessment years would run from A.Y. 2016-17 to A.Y. 2022-23.
2.6 On these facts, A.Y. 2014-15 falls outside the permissible block period of six assessment years reckoned from the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the documents were handed over, rendering initiation of section 153C proceedings for A.Y. 2014-15 time-barred.
2.7 The Court noted that the Revenue did not controvert the factual sequence, including the date of handing over of documents and the date of recording of satisfaction, and thus accepted the factual foundation of the assessee's plea on limitation.
2.8 Respectfully following the binding decisions cited, the Court treated the year relating to the date of handing over of documents as the relevant "year of search" for the assessee and applied the statutory scheme of section 153C read with section 153A accordingly.
(c) Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that, when the date of handing over of seized documents to the Assessing Officer of the assessee (a person other than the searched person) is taken as the determinative event for computing the block period under section 153C, the relevant block of six assessment years does not include A.Y. 2014-15.
2.10 The proceedings initiated under section 153C for A.Y. 2014-15 were therefore held to be barred by limitation, and the assessment framed under section 153C for that year was declared null and void and quashed.
2.11 In view of the quashing of the assessment on this legal ground, the Court did not adjudicate the remaining jurisdictional objections or the grounds on merits of additions under sections 69A and 69C, holding that such adjudication would be academic; those grounds were left open.