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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the assessment order passed under section 143(3) was void for want of a valid notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1.2 Whether the prior approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind, thereby vitiating the assessment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of assessment for non-service of notice under section 143(2)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal referred to section 143(2), which mandates that where a return has been furnished, the Assessing Officer shall serve a notice requiring the assessee to attend or produce evidence, within the prescribed time limit; such notice is a sine qua non for a valid assessment under section 143(3).
2.2 The Tribunal relied on the binding precedent of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hotel Blue Moon, holding that the requirement of notice under section 143(2) is mandatory and not a mere procedural irregularity, and that failure to issue such notice renders the assessment invalid.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The assessee contended that no notice under section 143(2) was ever issued/served, pointing out that on the income-tax portal, though a tab of section 143(2) appeared, no attachment of any notice was available for download, evidencing non-issuance/non-service.
2.4 The Assessing Officer, in his report, claimed that a notice under section 143(2) was issued on 05.11.2020 and relied on an e-mail delivery status screenshot.
2.5 The Tribunal compared (i) the e-mail delivery status showing "05/11/2020 11:06:17 AM", and (ii) the digitally signed notice on record showing the date and time as "November 05, 2020 11:07 AM". On this comparison, the Tribunal inferred that the alleged e-mail was dispatched prior to the digital signing of the notice.
2.6 From this sequencing, and in the absence of any contrary explanation or evidence from the Revenue that a valid notice (as an attachment) accompanied the e-mail, the Tribunal concluded that the e-mail did not contain the notice as an attachment and that no further attempt at service was made.
2.7 The Tribunal held that merely having a notice in the assessment file does not establish service on the assessee; actual service is required. As the Department failed to rebut the inference that no valid notice was served, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal held that the statutory notice contemplated by section 143(2) was not served on the assessee.
2.9 Applying the law laid down in Hotel Blue Moon, the Tribunal held that the assessment order under section 143(3) lacked jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed on this ground alone.
2.10 The additional ground challenging the validity of the assessment for non-issuance/non-service of notice under section 143(2) was allowed.
Issue 2: Validity of approval under section 153D and its effect on the assessment
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.11 Section 153D requires that no order of assessment or reassessment under section 153A shall be passed by the Assessing Officer without the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner.
2.12 The Tribunal referred to and followed recent Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including ACIT v. Serajuddin & Co., PCIT v. Anuj Bansal, PCIT v. Sapna Gupta, PCIT v. MDLR Hotels (P) Ltd., and PCIT v. Shiv Kumar Nayyar, which hold that:
(a) Approval under section 153D is a mandatory safeguard.
(b) Such approval cannot be granted mechanically or as a mere formality.
(c) There must be an indication of application of mind to the draft assessment orders and material on record.
(d) Approval should not be granted in a bulk, consolidated manner for multiple years without separate consideration.
2.13 The Tribunal also relied on co-ordinate bench decisions (e.g., Harish Bajaj v. DCIT; Wave Industries (P) Ltd. v. DCIT; Santosh Subhashappa Mukta v. DCIT), which quashed assessments where approval under section 153D was found to be mechanical.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The approval in the present case was granted by the Joint Commissioner, Central Range, Jaipur, by a single consolidated communication covering multiple assessment years, including the year under appeal.
2.15 The text of the approval, as noted by the Tribunal, did not refer to:
(a) Any seized material,
(b) The appraisal report,
(c) Any specific draft assessment order, or
(d) Any reasons or analysis indicating examination of the record for the particular assessment year.
2.16 The Assessing Officer's subsequent report merely stated that approval was accorded "after discussion" and after "verification and examination" of material, but no contemporaneous evidence or record of such examination was produced before the Tribunal.
2.17 The Tribunal held that a bare, consolidated approval letter without any indication of year-wise or issue-wise consideration, or reference to underlying material, does not meet the standard of a meaningful, independent application of mind required under section 153D.
2.18 Following the cited precedents, the Tribunal treated such approval as mechanical and invalid.
Conclusions
2.19 The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D in the assessee's case was accorded in a mechanical, consolidated manner, without proper application of mind to the assessment for the year under appeal.
2.20 Consequently, the approval was declared invalid, and the assessment order founded on such invalid approval was held to be unsustainable in law.
2.21 The additional ground challenging the assessment on account of invalid approval under section 153D was allowed.
Overall disposition and effect on remaining grounds
2.22 Having quashed the assessment order for (i) absence of a valid notice under section 143(2), and (ii) invalid/mechanical approval under section 153D, the Tribunal held that all remaining grounds on merits (cash addition under section 69A, jewellery addition, brokerage addition, applicability of section 115BBE, and other factual issues) had become academic.
2.23 The Tribunal therefore did not adjudicate the merits of the additions or other substantive grounds.
2.24 The appeal was allowed on the jurisdictional/legal grounds alone.