Statutory notice under cheque dishonour law is not proved by third-party receipt alone without evidence of the accused's knowledge.

Service of statutory notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a mandatory condition precedent, and proof of dispatch to the correct address does not by itself complete service where the notice is received only by a third person and there is no evidence that the accused knew of that receipt. The presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act applies where service is effected, refused, or deliberately evaded, but not on these facts. Because the complainant did not prove legally attributable notice to the accused, the cheque dishonour conviction and sentence could not be sustained and were set aside.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether service of the statutory notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on a third person, without evidence that the accused knew of such service, satisfies the mandatory notice requirement; (ii) Whether the conviction and sentence for the cheque dishonour offence could be sustained on the evidence on record.

Issue (i): Whether service of the statutory notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on a third person, without evidence that the accused knew of such service, satisfies the mandatory notice requirement.

Analysis: The statutory notice requirement is a condition precedent for prosecution under Section 138. The presumption of service arising from dispatch to the correct address under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 operates where notice is sent to the drawer and service is either effected, refused, or shown to have been deliberately evaded. That presumption does not, on the facts found, extend to a case where the notice is actually received by a third person and there is no evidence that the accused had knowledge of such receipt. The authorities relied on for constructive service were distinguished on facts, and the earlier view treating service on a relative as sufficient without proof of knowledge was affirmed as the governing principle on the facts of this case.

Conclusion: The notice was not validly served on the accused for the purposes of Section 138(b), and the prosecution could not be sustained on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction and sentence for the cheque dishonour offence could be sustained on the evidence on record.

Analysis: The postal acknowledgement showed receipt of notice by a third person, while the complainant led no evidence that the accused was aware of such service. In the absence of proof of knowledge, the mandatory notice requirement remained unfulfilled. Since compliance with the notice requirement is foundational to liability under Section 138, the conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below could not stand.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were unsustainable and were set aside; the accused was acquitted.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded because the statutory notice requirement was not proved against the accused, and the resulting conviction under the cheque dishonour provision was vacated.

Ratio Decidendi: Service of notice under Section 138(b) is not established merely by proof of delivery to a third person at the correct address unless the complainant also proves that the accused had knowledge of such service or that service was otherwise legally attributable to the accused.

---