Revisional interference limits in cheque dishonour cases: admitted signatures trigger statutory presumptions, and bare loss pleas fail.

Revisional interference in a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act conviction is confined to examining legality, correctness and propriety of the concurrent findings, and a revisional court does not act as a second appellate court. Once the cheque signatures were admitted, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt, and the accused failed to rebut them by a probable defence. A bare plea that the cheque was lost or misused, unsupported by complaint or evidence, was insufficient, and dishonour on stop-payment instructions remained within Section 138. The conviction was upheld and no revisional interference was warranted.

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Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with in revision on the grounds that the cheque return memo was not proved, the reason for dishonour was said to be inconsistent, and the accused had failed to establish that the cheque was lost or misused.

Analysis: The revisional court's interference is limited to testing the correctness, legality and propriety of the concurrent findings and it does not function as a second appellate court. Once the signatures on the cheque were admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The burden then shifted to the accused to rebut those presumptions by raising a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. The defence that the cheque was misplaced or stolen was not supported by any complaint or other evidence, and a bare assertion was insufficient to displace the statutory presumptions. The plea that the dishonour reason was inconsistent or that no formal return memo was produced was also rejected, because dishonour on "stop payment" instructions still attracts Section 138, and Section 146 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 does not require a particular mode of intimation of dishonour. The challenge to the trial procedure did not show any prejudice, and the accused also failed to show that the concurrent findings were perverse or illegal.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld and no revisional interference was warranted.

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