Section 293 bars partition suits that would defeat seizure and retention proceedings under the Income-tax Act.

Section 293 bars civil court jurisdiction where a suit, in substance and ultimate effect, would set aside or modify a proceeding taken or order made under the Income-tax Act, 1961. A partition suit seeking release of seized gold ornaments would directly defeat retention under section 132(5) and interfere with proceedings under section 132B, so it could not be entertained by the civil court. The availability of the statutory objection remedy under section 132(11), including for a third party, reinforced the exclusion of civil jurisdiction. The suit was therefore not maintainable.

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Issues: Whether a suit for partition, if its effect would be to take seized assets out of an order passed under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and thereby affect proceedings under section 132B, is barred by section 293 of the Act and outside the jurisdiction of the civil court.

Analysis: The bar in section 293 is to be applied by looking at the substance and ultimate effect of the suit, not merely its form. Although section 132 does not give finality to the order under section 132(5), the decree sought in the partition suit would directly nullify the Department's retention of the seized gold ornaments and would necessarily interfere with proceedings under section 132B. The Act also provided a statutory objection remedy under section 132(11), and the words used there were wide enough to permit an application by a third party. Where the suit, in substance, would set aside or modify a proceeding taken or order made under the Act, the civil court cannot entertain it.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by section 293 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and was not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: When a civil suit, however framed, would in substance set aside or modify a proceeding taken or order made under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the express statutory bar in section 293 excludes civil court jurisdiction; the availability of a specific statutory remedy also supports that exclusion.

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