Technical exoneration in customs adjudication does not bar criminal prosecution; disputed company-role issues must go to trial.

Criminal prosecution under customs law is independent of departmental adjudication, so setting aside an adjudication order on a technical ground does not, by itself, bar the criminal complaint or justify discharge. Exoneration in departmental proceedings affects prosecution only where it is on merits on the same allegations and records a clear finding of no contravention. Discharge is also unavailable where the complaint and the accused's statement disclose prima facie involvement in the company's affairs, because whether a person was in charge of and responsible for its business is a disputed factual issue for trial, not the discharge stage.

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Issues: (i) Whether the criminal complaint could be quashed or the petitioner discharged merely because the adjudication proceedings under the Customs law had been set aside; (ii) Whether the petitioner was entitled to discharge on the ground that he was not involved in the affairs of the accused company.

Issue (i): Whether the criminal complaint could be quashed or the petitioner discharged merely because the adjudication proceedings under the Customs law had been set aside;

Analysis: The adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution were held to be independent. Exoneration in departmental proceedings affects criminal prosecution only when it is on merits and on the same allegations, with a clear finding that there was no contravention. Here, the appellate setting aside of the adjudication order was on a technical ground relating to the authority issuing the show-cause notices, and not on a merits determination of innocence.

Conclusion: The setting aside of the adjudication order did not bar the criminal complaint or justify discharge.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner was entitled to discharge on the ground that he was not involved in the affairs of the accused company.

Analysis: The complaint and the petitioner's statement under the Customs Act disclosed material suggesting prima facie involvement in the affairs of the company. The question whether he was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business raised disputed questions of fact that could not be resolved at the discharge stage.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to discharge on this ground.

Final Conclusion: No ground was made out for interference under the inherent jurisdiction, and the prosecution was permitted to proceed to trial.

Ratio Decidendi: Technical exoneration in adjudication proceedings does not preclude criminal prosecution, and disputed questions of a person's role in the offence cannot be decided at the discharge stage.

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