Issues: (i) Whether charges collected for certification of SOFTEX forms, issuance of NoCs and allied assistance to software exporting units constituted consideration for taxable Business Support Service or related to sovereign/statutory functions outside service tax; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period was valid for non-payment of service tax on the impugned receipts; (iii) Whether penalty for non-payment of service tax was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether charges collected for certification of SOFTEX forms, issuance of NoCs and allied assistance to software exporting units constituted consideration for taxable Business Support Service or related to sovereign/statutory functions outside service tax.

Analysis: The appellant, though functioning under governmental administrative control, was an autonomous society and not a Government department. Statutory authorisation or exclusivity to perform an activity does not by itself make that activity sovereign. The certification, approvals and related assistance directly facilitated the export and business operations of recipient units, and the charges had a direct nexus with identifiable services rendered to them. Circular No. 96/7/2007-ST excludes functions of public authorities only where the collection is a compulsory statutory levy payable into the Government account. The impugned charges were neither established as statutory exactions nor deposited into the Government Treasury; they were retained and used by the appellant.

Conclusion: The impugned activities were taxable as Business Support Service, and the charges were consideration for taxable services, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period was valid for non-payment of service tax on the impugned receipts.

Analysis: The taxable value of the impugned activities was not declared in statutory service tax returns, despite the appellant being registered and discharging service tax on other services. Availability of information or records during audit did not amount to prescribed disclosure of the taxable receipts, which were quantified only upon departmental scrutiny.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty for non-payment of service tax was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant failed to correctly assess, disclose and pay tax on the impugned receipts over a substantial period despite its service tax registration and compliance for other taxable services.

Conclusion: Penalty was sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Charges retained by an autonomous body for certifications, approvals and facilitation supplied to exporting units do not acquire the character of sovereign or statutory collections merely because the activities are government-authorised.

Ratio Decidendi: A government-authorised activity performed by an autonomous body is not immune from service tax where the amount collected is consideration for an identifiable service to a business recipient rather than a compulsory statutory levy payable to the Government.

Issues: (i) Whether differential excise duty on freight and loading charges could be sustained beyond the transactions established by the sample purchase orders relied upon in the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for non-inclusion of freight and loading charges in assessable value; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.

Issue (i): Whether differential excise duty on freight and loading charges could be sustained beyond the transactions established by the sample purchase orders relied upon in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, inclusion of outward freight depends on the place of removal. The relied-upon purchase orders supported a factual distinction between FOR sales, where the buyer's premises constituted the place of removal and freight formed part of the assessable value, and ex-factory sales, where freight was separately indicated and was not includible. The show-cause notice relied only on sample purchase orders; the adjudicating authority could not travel beyond that evidentiary foundation to presume that all other sales were FOR sales.

Conclusion: Differential duty was sustainable only for transactions established as FOR sales; the remaining demand was rightly dropped. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for non-inclusion of freight and loading charges in assessable value.

Analysis: The respondent's records and transportation activity had been examined in departmental audits during the relevant period. Further, the inclusion of outward freight and determination of the place of removal involved conflicting judicial views and an interpretative dispute. Circular No. 1065/4/2015-CX dated 08.06.2018 recognised that the extended period should not be invoked where an assessee had adopted an alternative interpretation before clarification by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.

Analysis: The foundation for alleging suppression with intent to evade duty did not survive once the extended period was held inapplicable in the circumstances of the interpretative dispute and departmental knowledge.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not imposable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicating authority's valuation findings, restriction of duty to proven FOR transactions, and deletion of the time-barred demand and penalty were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Outward freight is includible in excise assessable value only where the evidence establishes an FOR sale with the buyer's premises as the place of removal; a demand cannot be extended beyond the transactions and evidence forming the foundation of the show-cause notice.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of reversed Cenvat credit can be denied solely because the original invoices are unavailable and the credit is supported by photocopies of invoices; (ii) Whether a refund claim is inadmissible merely because it is not consequent upon an earlier appellate order.

Issue (i): Whether refund of reversed Cenvat credit can be denied solely because the original invoices are unavailable and the credit is supported by photocopies of invoices.

Analysis: Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 requires prescribed documents to establish duty payment, receipt of goods, identity of the recipient and protection against duplicate or fraudulent credit. However, loss or non-availability of an original invoice does not invariably defeat credit where the defect is satisfactorily explained and the duty-paid nature of the goods, their receipt and use, and eligibility to credit are independently established. The photocopies were not found fabricated or unreliable, and there was no allegation or evidence of fraud, manipulation, or duplicate availment. The factual genuineness and admissibility of the credit had been verified and concurrently accepted.

Conclusion: Otherwise admissible Cenvat credit cannot be denied solely for non-production of original invoices where the underlying transaction is genuine and independently verified.

Issue (ii): Whether a refund claim is inadmissible merely because it is not consequent upon an earlier appellate order.

Analysis: Reversal of credit following an audit objection is not a final adjudication of inadmissibility. A subsequent claim for refund or re-credit requires independent determination on its substantive merits under the applicable statutory framework; the absence of a prior appellate order does not determine the claim's admissibility.

Conclusion: A refund claim is not inadmissible merely because it does not arise from an earlier appellate order.

Final Conclusion: The refund of credit found substantively eligible after verification of the duty-paid transaction remains legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural deficiency in the prescribed credit document does not extinguish substantively established Cenvat credit where the transaction is genuine, independently verified, and free from fraud or duplicate availment.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice invoking the extended limitation under Section 74, based on alleged input-tax-credit mismatch and short payment, was sustainable without pleaded foundational facts establishing fraud, wilful misrepresentation, or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Section 73 permits proceedings in cases not involving fraud, wilful misrepresentation, or suppression, subject to the prescribed limitation linked to the annual return under Section 44 and Rule 80. The limitation under Section 73(10) concerns passing the order, while Section 73(2) requires issuance of notice at least three months before that deadline. The pandemic-related exclusion did not preserve the notice issued after 28.02.2025 under the ordinary limitation. Section 74 permits the longer period only upon satisfaction that fraud, wilful misrepresentation, or suppression caused the tax shortfall or excess credit. An audit objection does not substitute the Assessing Officer's independent satisfaction. The notice contained only a bare assertion of suppression, without facts demonstrating a deliberate device to evade tax or avail excess credit; the Department's reference of the audit objection to the Public Accounts Committee further indicated absence of such satisfaction. Explanation 2 to Section 74, having been omitted from 01.11.2024, could not support the allegation. A protective demand is not a statutory measure under the GST regime.

Conclusion: The notice could not validly invoke Section 74, and the consequential adjudication was unsustainable for want of foundational facts supporting fraud, wilful misrepresentation, or suppression. Fresh proceedings under Section 74 remain permissible only if a notice discloses the requisite foundational facts and the order is made within the remaining extended period.

Issues: (i) Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals; (ii) Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals.

Analysis: No customs duty, interest, fine or penalty was involved. Even treating the asserted MEIS entitlement as the disputed amount, its value was Rs. 47,19,103/-, below the Rs. 50,00,000/- threshold prescribed for Customs appeals before CESTAT. The dispute did not fall within any identified exception to the monetary-limit policy, and Section 131BA required due regard to such Board instructions.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under the applicable monetary-limit instruction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 149 permits post-export amendment where it is supported by documentary evidence existing at the time of export. During the relevant export period, the provision contained no prescribed limitation period; the subsequently introduced restriction could not be applied retrospectively. Repeated "NO" declarations, delay, and possible fiscal consequences were relevant to discretion but did not create an absolute bar. Amendment of the shipping bills does not itself confer MEIS benefit, which remains subject to independent scrutiny by the competent authority under the applicable scheme.

Conclusion: Amendment under Section 149 was legally permissible, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order permitting the respondent to seek amendment of the shipping bills remains operative, while entitlement to MEIS benefit must be determined independently by the competent authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-export amendment of customs documents under Section 149 cannot be denied solely because it may facilitate a fiscal incentive claim or because a later-introduced limitation period is invoked; the governing test is whether contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the amendment under the law applicable at the time of export.

Issues: (i) Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505; (ii) Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505.

Analysis: Heading 4016 is a residual, material-based heading for vulcanised-rubber articles not covered elsewhere, whereas Heading 9503 provides the specific functional classification for toys. The HSN Explanatory Notes expressly include toy balloons in Heading 9503 and are a safe guide to tariff interpretation. Under Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the heading and applicable notes govern classification before recourse to general or residual entries. The explanation inserted by Notification No. 02/2021-Customs also clarifies that toy balloons made of natural rubber latex fall under Heading 9503. Heading 9505 covers festive and carnival articles but does not include latex toy balloons; prior classification of differently described decorative or foil balloons did not govern the classification of the goods in issue.

Conclusion: The balloons are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 as toy balloons, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.

Analysis: The record showed that identical goods had initially been classified under Heading 9503, followed by changes to Headings 4016 and 9505. The proprietor admitted requesting suppliers to alter classification in shipping documents. The change from Heading 9503 to Heading 4016 was linked to avoiding BIS requirements, and the goods were described by a supplier as toy latex balloons. The inconsistent classifications and incorrect availment of exemption established malafide intent rather than a bona fide classification dispute.

Conclusion: The penalties are sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reclassification, consequential differential-duty liability, and penal consequences remain enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are specifically covered by a functional tariff heading and the HSN Explanatory Notes, classification under that specific heading prevails over a general, material-based residual heading.

Issues: (i) Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful; (ii) Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.

Issue (i): Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful.

Analysis: The declared transaction value was rejected under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 on the basis of higher values of comparable imports available in the National Import Database. The reassessment under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied Rule 5 by relying on contemporaneous imports of wall paper at the same commercial level, quantity and country of origin. Of the comparable imports, USD 3.5 per kg was the lowest value. The prior self-assessed import relied upon was not comparable in time, and the available import documents did not establish a material difference in the description or specifications of the goods.

Conclusion: The enhancement of value to USD 3.5 per kg was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires issuance of a speaking order. The assessment had already been remanded with a direction to issue such order after affording a personal hearing. In those circumstances, the pending obligation to issue the directed speaking order did not justify quashing the assessment; recourse lay before the concerned customs authority for implementation of the remand direction.

Conclusion: Quashing of the assessment was not warranted, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The comparable-import valuation stands sustained, while the separate remanded assessment remains subject to issuance of the required speaking order by the competent customs authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a declared transaction value is validly rejected on reasonable doubt, customs value may be redetermined from the lowest reliable contemporaneous transaction value of comparable imports satisfying the prescribed criteria.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process; (ii) Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process.

Analysis: Section 10 permits a corporate debtor to seek insolvency resolution, but the Adjudicating Authority must assess whether the application is a bona fide attempt at resolution and is not being used to frustrate creditor recovery. The filing followed commencement of recovery measures, while substantial hypothecated plant and machinery was found missing, no satisfactory explanation or supporting fixed-asset records were furnished, and the corporate debtor had no meaningful receivables or immovable assets. These circumstances supported the finding that the application sought a moratorium to obstruct recovery proceedings rather than to achieve genuine resolution.

Conclusion: The rejection of the Section 10 application was justified; the application was initiated with malicious intent and amounted to abuse of the insolvency process. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.

Analysis: A penalty for fraudulent conduct must be supported by reasons demonstrating the nature and magnitude of the conduct and must conform to the principle of proportionality. The record did not disclose reasons justifying the quantum of Rs. 10 lakh, notwithstanding the finding of malicious intent.

Conclusion: The penalty was excessive and was reduced from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh. This issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the insolvency application was a mala fide attempt to secure protection from creditor recovery remains operative, while the financial sanction is recalibrated to a proportionate amount.

Ratio Decidendi: An application for corporate insolvency resolution may be rejected where the surrounding conduct establishes that it is a fraudulent or malicious device to defeat creditor recovery, and any resulting penalty must be reasoned and proportionate.

Issues: Whether admission of an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process could be sustained when the outstanding financial debt on the date of the admission order was below the statutory default threshold.

Analysis: The admitted payment records showed that the corporate debtor had repaid Rs. 2.25 crore of the principal debt before the admission order. The remaining amount of Rs. 93,88,310 was below the threshold of Rs. 1 crore. The financial creditors had received those payments but had not placed that material fact before the Adjudicating Authority before the order was made. Consequently, the prerequisite default amount for admission under Section 7 was not present on the relevant date.

Conclusion: The admission of the insolvency application was legally unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice; (ii) Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Issue (i): Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice.

Analysis: Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires the proper officer to record reasons to believe that goods are liable to confiscation. Where physical seizure is impracticable, the provisos require a statutory order governing custody or restraining dealings with the goods. Instruction No. 01/2017-Cus. dated 08.02.2017 likewise requires an appropriate seizure order, in addition to a panchnama, recording such reasons. A panchnama directing the importer not to deal with the vehicle was only detention and could not substitute the required statutory order.

Analysis: The seizure memo was issued more than a year after detention, followed by the confiscation notice. The authorities could not retain the vehicle indefinitely under the label of detention and then restart the limitation period by issuing a delayed seizure memo. The six-month period, with only the permissible further extension contemplated by Section 110(2), stood exhausted from the detention.

Conclusion: The delayed seizure memo and consequential confiscation notice could not sustain continued retention of the vehicle, which was required to be released.

Issue (ii): Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Analysis: The provisional-release conditions requiring a bond and bank guarantee were founded on paragraph 2 of Circular No. 35/2017-Customs dated 16.08.2017. That paragraph had been set aside to the extent it curtailed the adjudicating authority's discretion. Reliance on the invalidated paragraph rendered the conditions unsustainable.

Conclusion: The provisional-release order and its conditions were illegal.

Final Conclusion: Customs authorities must exercise seizure powers through the statutory procedure and cannot use prolonged detention without a valid order to defeat the prescribed time limits; the vehicle must be released within two weeks, with costs imposed on the authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A panchnama-based detention cannot replace a reasoned statutory seizure or restraint order under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the authorities cannot defer the statutory limitation for confiscation proceedings by subsequently issuing a seizure memo after prolonged detention.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail in prosecution for alleged fraudulent availment of input tax credit.

Analysis: The alleged offence carried a maximum sentence of five years; the petitioner had remained in custody for about four months and had no criminal antecedents. The evidence was substantially documentary, and no material indicated a likelihood of tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses, absconding, or failing to participate in the trial. Continued pre-trial detention was not justified where the trial was unlikely to conclude shortly, consistently with the presumption of innocence, bail being the rule, and the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to bail, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reliance on statements recorded during Customs investigation and electronic records recovered from the importer's laptop, without cross-examination or a certificate for electronic evidence, violated principles of natural justice and could establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration; (ii) Whether the declared transaction value was validly rejected and the assessable value sequentially re-determined under the Customs valuation rules.

Issue (i): Whether reliance on statements recorded during Customs investigation and electronic records recovered from the importer's laptop, without cross-examination or a certificate for electronic evidence, violated principles of natural justice and could establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration.

Analysis: The relevant statements were made by the importer, its proprietor, and its agents. Their non-production for cross-examination did not cause a breach of natural justice, as they could not be compelled to depose against themselves. Voluntary statements under the Customs law were admissible as substantive evidence. The recovered laptop data, retrieved and forensically examined in the importer's presence, constituted original electronic records; consequently, certification required for secondary electronic copies was not applicable.

Conclusion: The statements and original electronic records were validly relied upon to establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the declared transaction value was validly rejected and the assessable value sequentially re-determined under the Customs valuation rules.

Analysis: The admissions of undervaluation and misdeclaration, together with supplier invoices and other electronic material recovered during the search, provided a basis to reject the declared value under the valuation rules. The record supported the finding that the re-determination was undertaken by applying the prescribed rules in sequence.

Conclusion: Rejection of the declared transaction value and sequential re-determination of the assessable value were valid; this issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessed customs value and the consequential duty liability, confiscation, appropriation, and penalty consequences remain sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Voluntary Customs statements and original electronic records recovered from an importer may substantiate undervaluation and misdeclaration, furnishing a valid basis for rejection of transaction value and sequential valuation under the prescribed rules.

Issues: Whether the Registrar of Companies was required to implement the restoration direction despite the stated intention to file a review petition.

Analysis: The earlier restoration judgment remained subsisting and operative. The intended filing of a review petition did not constitute a ground to withhold compliance with that judgment.

Conclusion: The Registrar of Companies was directed to forthwith restore the company's name and reflect its status as active on the Ministry of Corporate Affairs website, with the action remaining subject to any order passed in a review application.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for a service-tax demand founded solely on third-party information received from the Income Tax Department.

Analysis: Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 permits invocation of the extended limitation period only where the requisite elements such as fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax are established. The demand was based entirely on third-party data, without evidence establishing any such ingredient. In these circumstances, the extended period was unavailable and the notice issued after expiry of the normal limitation period could not sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand was barred by limitation; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether annual differential refund could be taken as suo motu credit in the account current under Notification No. 39/2001-C.E. dated 31.07.2001; (ii) Whether the recovery notice issued more than five years after availment of the credit was within limitation.

Issue (i): Whether annual differential refund could be taken as suo motu credit in the account current under Notification No. 39/2001-C.E. dated 31.07.2001.

Analysis: The notification permitted an eligible manufacturer to opt for credit in the account current, subject to submission and verification of prescribed statements. The annual differential-refund statement had been filed within the prescribed period, but the jurisdictional authority failed to determine or communicate the claim despite being required to do so. The subsequent credit was taken after prolonged inaction by the departmental authority; the decisions concerning adjustment of excess duty, duplicate payment, or credit during pending adjudication were factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The suo motu credit of the annual differential amount could not be faulted in the circumstances and the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the recovery notice issued more than five years after availment of the credit was within limitation.

Analysis: Irregular or excess credit under the notification was recoverable as erroneous refund, attracting the limitation framework under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Even where the extended period applied, recovery proceedings had to be initiated within five years from the date of refund. The notice was issued after expiry of five years from the April 2010 credit.

Conclusion: The recovery notice was time-barred, and proceedings founded on it were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proposed recovery of credit, together with consequential interest and penalty, lacked both temporal and substantive validity.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a notification treats recovery of irregular refund credit as recovery of erroneously refunded excise duty, the five-year outer limit under the extended limitation provision applies from the date of credit, and departmental failure to decide a timely annual differential-refund claim cannot render the resulting credit unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can proceed against a director where it lacks specific averments that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time.

Analysis: Section 141 creates an exception to the ordinary rule against vicarious criminal liability and must be strictly construed. Its two requirements-that the accused was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business-are cumulative. Mere designation as a director, general allegations of involvement in day-to-day affairs, or an unspecified allegation that the cheque was issued by the accused persons do not meet this threshold. The complaint did not identify the cheque signatory or attribute any individual role, participation, control, or responsibility in the relevant transaction to the petitioner.

Conclusion: In the absence of foundational and specific averments satisfying Section 141, no vicarious liability could be fastened on the petitioner; continuation of the proceeding against the petitioner constituted an abuse of process of law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, permitting recourse to the statutory remedies for revocation of cancellation of registration and appeal.

Issues: Whether a penalty under Section 122(1A) could be imposed where that penalty had not been proposed against the noticee in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed specified penalties against the noticee under Section 122(1), while the separate penalty under Section 122(1A) was proposed against its handler/operator. The adjudication order nevertheless imposed the Section 122(1A) penalty upon the noticee, thereby conflating penalties proposed against distinct persons. This factual discrepancy was not specifically controverted.

Conclusion: A penalty under Section 122(1A) could not be sustained against the noticee when it was not proposed against it in the show-cause notice.