Proof of rashness or negligence is essential in accident prosecutions; high speed alone does not justify interference with acquittal.

In a criminal prosecution arising from a truck accident, the Supreme Court noted that rashness or negligence in driving must be proved by the prosecution as an essential ingredient of the charge. High speed by itself was not sufficient to establish rashness or negligence, especially where there was no evidence explaining what "high speed" meant in the circumstances, no material on the sudden jerk, and the motor vehicle inspector's report was not produced or proved. The Court also rejected reliance on res ipsa loquitur to fill the evidentiary gap in the absence of a statutory exception. On that reasoning, the acquittal was left undisturbed because the High Court's view was reasonably possible.

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Issues: Whether the respondent's acquittal for offences arising out of the truck accident should be interfered with in the absence of proof of rashness or negligence in driving.

Analysis: The conviction recorded by the trial court and affirmed in part by the appellate court rested on a finding of high speed and on the application of res ipsa loquitur, but there was no specific finding that the respondent drove rashly or negligently. High speed by itself was held not to establish rashness or negligence. The prosecution led no material to show what "high speed" meant in the circumstances, the evidence about the sudden jerk remained unexplained, and the motor vehicle inspector's report was not produced and the inspector was not examined. In a criminal case, the burden remained on the prosecution to prove every essential ingredient of the charge, and no presumption of criminality could be drawn in the absence of statutory exception.

Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld, as the view taken by the High Court was a reasonably possible view and no case for interference was made out.

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