Issues: Whether the substituted proviso to Section 107(6) governing pre-deposit applies to appeals arising from show-cause notices issued before 01.10.2025.

Analysis: The show-cause notices initiating the adjudicatory proceedings were issued in 2020. The applicable appellate pre-deposit regime is determined by the provision in force when those proceedings commenced; consequently, the later substituted proviso does not govern the proposed appeals.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit requirement for the appeals shall be governed by Section 107(6) as it stood when the respective show-cause notices were issued, and not by the proviso substituted with effect from 01.10.2025.

Issues: (i) Whether the period spent in pursuing refund and amendment proceedings could be excluded on the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for determining limitation of the statutory appeals; (ii) Whether the appeal against the assessment dated 06.05.2019 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the period spent in pursuing refund and amendment proceedings could be excluded on the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for determining limitation of the statutory appeals.

Analysis: At the time the refund applications were instituted, binding jurisdictional law treated a refund under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 as an independent remedy without a prior challenge to assessment. The subsequent decision requiring modification of the assessment before refund fundamentally altered that legal position. The importer promptly sought amendment under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 and pursued the refund proceedings without negligence or inaction.

Analysis: Although a period preceding institution of an original proceeding is ordinarily not excludable under the principles stated in Section 14, the earlier period could not be treated as ordinary inaction where the importer had acted under the then binding jurisdictional position. The period up to 02.06.2020 was excludable on the peculiar transitional facts. The resulting limitation period was further covered by the statutory extension under Section 6 of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 and Notification G.S.R. 601(E) dated 30.09.2020; hence the appeals filed on 31.08.2020 were timely.

Conclusion: The benefit of the principles underlying Section 14 was available, and the statutory appeals were within limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal against the assessment dated 06.05.2019 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The appeal was filed within twenty-eight days of the out-of-charge date and therefore fell within the prescribed period under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The appeal was not barred by limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objections cannot preclude adjudication of the restored matters on their merits.

Issues: Whether GST on services rendered by an Advocate acting as an Insolvency Professional is payable under the reverse charge mechanism applicable to legal services or under the forward charge mechanism.

Analysis: Section 9(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 establishes forward charge as the default mechanism, while Section 9(3) permits reverse charge only for notified categories. Notification No. 13/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, as corrected on 25.09.2017, applies reverse charge to legal services supplied by advocates. Insolvency Professionals, however, are independently regulated under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016. Their functions in conducting insolvency resolution are distinct from conventional legal services.

Analysis: Under the Scheme of Classification of Services, insolvency and receivership services fall under the specific service classification 998241, separately from legal services under classification 99821. The specific classification of insolvency and receivership services prevails over the general classification of legal services. The nature and capacity in which the service is supplied, rather than the supplier's underlying professional qualification or enrolment as an advocate, determine the applicable GST treatment.

Conclusion: Services rendered by an Advocate in the capacity of an Insolvency Professional are insolvency and receivership services subject to the forward charge mechanism. The Advocate must obtain GST registration and furnish GST-compliant invoices for such services; reverse charge continues to apply only to legal services rendered in the capacity of an Advocate.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a service supplied by an advocate is specifically classified as insolvency and receivership service, its GST treatment is governed by that specific classification and not by the reverse charge mechanism applicable to legal services.

Issues: (i) Whether the personal guarantee covered the renewed credit facilities sanctioned on 12.04.2018; (ii) Whether the guarantor's liability was confined to Rs. 40 crore exclusive of interest.

Issue (i): Whether the personal guarantee covered the renewed credit facilities sanctioned on 12.04.2018.

Analysis: The guarantee deed was continuing in nature and remained operative until the outstanding dues were paid. The renewal of the credit facility at the existing level was also signed by the guarantor on 12.04.2018.

Conclusion: The guarantee extended to the renewed credit facilities. The finding is against the guarantor.

Issue (ii): Whether the guarantor's liability was confined to Rs. 40 crore exclusive of interest.

Analysis: The guarantee fixed the principal limit at Rs. 40 crore but expressly provided for interest at 12.70% per annum, or such rate as notified by the bank, from the date of demand.

Conclusion: The liability was not limited to Rs. 40 crore exclusive of contractual interest. The finding is against the guarantor.

Final Conclusion: The admission of the personal guarantor insolvency application warranted no appellate interference.

Ratio Decidendi: A continuing personal guarantee covering a specified principal amount together with stipulated interest remains enforceable for renewed facilities where the guarantor has assented to the renewal.

Issues: (i) Whether protection from arrest can be granted while dismissing a pre-arrest bail application as not maintainable; (ii) Whether an order under Section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorising arrest must be communicated to the person sought to be arrested.

Issue (i): Whether protection from arrest can be granted while dismissing a pre-arrest bail application as not maintainable.

Analysis: Interim protection is ancillary to the substantive relief sought and cannot survive where the application itself is rejected. The same principle applies to a pre-arrest bail application dismissed as not maintainable: protection against arrest, being interim in nature, cannot be separately granted after such dismissal. Since mere summons under Section 70 does not make a person an accused, the rejection of the pre-arrest bail application was justified.

Conclusion: Protection from arrest could not validly be granted after dismissal of the pre-arrest bail application; the protective direction was set aside. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an order under Section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorising arrest must be communicated to the person sought to be arrested.

Analysis: An order under Section 69, founded on the Commissioner's reasons to believe and authorising arrest, is a necessary precondition for seeking anticipatory bail. Non-communication would impair the affected person's ability to seek anticipatory bail and challenge the authorisation and recorded reasons through judicial review. Communication does not obstruct investigation and may be effected electronically, in addition to legally permissible modes.

Conclusion: The Section 69 authorisation order must be communicated to the person sought to be arrested, and arrest cannot arise without such communication. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impermissible post-dismissal protection was invalidated, while the statutory arrest authorisation was required to be disclosed before any arrest, preserving access to available legal remedies.

Issues: (i) Scope of judicial review over a decision to issue a Look Out Circular on the ground that departure would be detrimental to the economic interests of India. (ii) Whether the material available justified interference with the Look Out Circular issued against the respondent.

Issue (i): Scope of judicial review over a decision to issue a Look Out Circular on the ground that departure would be detrimental to the economic interests of India.

Analysis: The 2017 amendment to paragraph 8(j) of the Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines permits issuance of a Look Out Circular in exceptional cases where, on inputs received, the competent authority considers a person's departure detrimental to India's economic interests. Judicial review remains available to test legality, relevance of material and manifest arbitrariness; however, it does not permit the Court to substitute its assessment for the executive's subjective satisfaction or assess the qualitative or quantitative sufficiency of the material. Greater restraint applies in fiscal and economic matters, except where the material is wholly speculative, nonexistent or incapable of supporting the decision.

Conclusion: The scope of judicial review does not extend to reassessing the sufficiency of material underlying the competent authority's decision to issue a Look Out Circular, absent no material or manifestly untenable material. This issue is in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the material available justified interference with the Look Out Circular issued against the respondent.

Analysis: The material before the originating authority was not confined to the alleged undisclosed foreign shareholding. It included material concerning alleged trade-based money laundering, hawala-linked transactions, over-invoiced exports, fraudulent export incentives, bogus purchases, fake invoices and fraudulent input tax credit involving entities controlled by the respondent. The official record supported the allegations recorded in the counter-affidavit. At the stage of judicial review, the eventual merits or outcome of the investigation were not to be determined; the material could not be characterised as irrelevant, inadmissible or insubstantial for forming the view that foreign travel could prejudice India's economic interests.

Conclusion: The Look Out Circular was supported by relevant and substantial material and was not liable to be quashed. This issue is in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The order invalidating the Look Out Circular was set aside, and the restraint on foreign travel remains legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where executive guidelines authorise a Look Out Circular upon subjective satisfaction, based on inputs, that a person's departure may harm India's economic interests, judicial review cannot reassess the sufficiency of the supporting material unless it is absent or manifestly untenable.

Issues: Whether mandatory pre-deposit for maintaining customs appeals was complied with where the amount was paid by the appellants' employer through the ICEGATE mechanism.

Analysis: Section 129E requires the appellant to deposit the prescribed percentage before an appeal can be entertained. The electronic voluntary-payment facility under Circular No. 27/2024-CUS had replaced manual TR-6 payments and required ICEGATE registration and an IEC; foreign-national appellants could not independently access that facility without an IEC, PAN and Indian mobile number. The payment challans identified each appellant and the impugned order, while the employer had executed indemnity bonds accepting liability for the penalties and related losses. These circumstances established that the employer's payment was made on behalf of, and attributable to, the appellants.

Conclusion: The employer's payment was treated as payment by the appellants, and the requirement of mandatory pre-deposit under Section 129E stood complied with.

Issues: (i) Whether diversion of imported goods from the designated public bonded warehouse to an unauthorised private yard contravened the warehousing requirements; (ii) Whether such contravention rendered the goods liable to confiscation; (iii) Whether the importer was liable for diversion carried out by its warehouse operator; (iv) Whether alleged irregularities in the search and electronic evidence vitiated the proceedings; (v) Whether redemption fine and penalty were legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether diversion of imported goods from the designated public bonded warehouse to an unauthorised private yard contravened the warehousing requirements.

Analysis: Permission for warehousing is confined to the warehouse specified by the proper officer. The warehousing bond and permission required direct deposit in the approved bonded warehouse so as to maintain uninterrupted customs control. The goods were admittedly transported to an unapproved private yard rather than the designated warehouse; custody with the same warehouse operator did not amount to substantial compliance.

Conclusion: The diversion contravened the warehousing requirements, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether such contravention rendered the goods liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Removal to an unauthorised premises was contrary to the permission granted for warehousing. Liability under the confiscation provision depends on breach of the conditions governing removal and warehousing, not on proof of clandestine clearance, actual duty evasion, sale, or mens rea.

Conclusion: The goods were liable to confiscation, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the importer was liable for diversion carried out by its warehouse operator.

Analysis: The operator had been engaged by the importer for transportation, handling, and warehousing. Acts of an authorised agent are deemed to have been undertaken with the importer's knowledge and consent unless the presumption is rebutted. No contemporaneous material established that the operator acted outside its authority, while the evidence supported the importer's knowledge of the storage arrangement.

Conclusion: The importer remained responsible for the diversion, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether alleged irregularities in the search and electronic evidence vitiated the proceedings.

Analysis: The contravention was independently established by transport and gate records, warehouse records, statements recorded during investigation, physical verification, and the admitted non-deposit of goods in the designated warehouse. The electronic communications were only corroborative; therefore, alleged defects in search authorisation or electronic-evidence requirements could not invalidate the adjudication.

Conclusion: The alleged evidentiary and search irregularities did not vitiate the proceedings, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether redemption fine and penalty were legally sustainable.

Analysis: Provisional release under bond and bank guarantee does not remove the power to confiscate goods and impose redemption fine. The importer's failure to ensure deposit in the designated warehouse rendered the goods confiscable, and the authorised operator's acts remained attributable to the importer. The fine was not shown to be arbitrary or disproportionate.

Conclusion: The redemption fine and penalty were legally sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Unauthorised diversion of warehoused imported goods outside the approved warehousing chain attracted the statutory consequences of confiscation, redemption fine, and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Imported goods removed under warehousing permission must be deposited in the specifically authorised bonded warehouse; diversion to an unauthorised premises attracts confiscation irrespective of duty evasion or mens rea, and an importer is answerable for acts of its authorised warehouse agent unless the statutory presumption is rebutted.

Issues: (i) Whether dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance with the conditional pre-deposit order was legally valid; (ii) Whether the subsequent mandatory 10% pre-deposit regime could validate the appeal dismissed under the earlier regime.

Issue (i): Whether dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance with the conditional pre-deposit order was legally valid.

Analysis: The pre-deposit order was reasoned: the adjournment request was considered and declined for recorded reasons, and 50% of the disputed tax was directed to be deposited. The applicable unamended provision empowered the appellate authority to impose a suitable pre-deposit while considering waiver. As the statutory appeal was conditional upon compliance, failure to comply without obtaining appropriate relief entitled the appellate authority to reject the appeal. No denial of natural justice, procedural illegality, or perversity was established.

Conclusion: Dismissal for failure to comply with the conditional pre-deposit was valid and was against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent mandatory 10% pre-deposit regime could validate the appeal dismissed under the earlier regime.

Analysis: The amended pre-deposit provision took effect after the impugned appellate order and operated prospectively. Rights and obligations arising before its commencement remained governed by the unamended regime. A later 10% deposit could not retrospectively cure default under the earlier conditional pre-deposit order.

Conclusion: The later 10% deposit could not validate the previously dismissed appeal and was against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The conditional pre-deposit requirement applicable at the relevant time remained enforceable, and the subsequent amendment afforded no retrospective curative benefit.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appeal is subject to a validly imposed pre-deposit condition under the applicable law, non-compliance permits dismissal of the appeal, and a subsequent prospective amendment cannot retrospectively cure that default.

Issues: Whether the assessee, having opted for proportionate reversal of common-input credit under Rule 6(3A), could be compelled to make percentage-based payment under Rule 6(3)(i) because of alleged procedural deficiencies in effecting or disclosing the reversals.

Analysis: Rule 6 permits an assessee using common inputs and input services for dutiable and exempted goods to choose the prescribed compliance mechanism. The choice between the alternatives under Rule 6(3) belongs to the assessee; the Revenue cannot substitute the percentage-based option under Rule 6(3)(i) merely because it disputes the assessee's application of the proportionate-reversal mechanism under Rule 6(3A). The appropriate course in such a case is to determine or disallow wrongly availed credit under the selected mechanism. The material, including certificates and intimations, substantiated proportionate reversal of credit. The substantive object of Rule 6-prevention of retention of credit attributable to exempted goods-was fulfilled. Non-reflection of reversals in ER-1 returns and other disclosure deficiencies were technical lapses that could not defeat established substantial compliance or justify a demand grossly disproportionate to the common credit availed. The Tribunal's finding on reversal of credit was factual and was not shown to be perverse; consequently, no substantial question of law arose under Section 35G.

Conclusion: The assessee could not be forced into the percentage-payment option under Rule 6(3)(i), and the Tribunal's acceptance of proportionate reversal was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has elected proportionate reversal under Rule 6(3A) and the substantive reversal of credit attributable to exempted goods is established, procedural or disclosure defects do not authorise the Revenue to impose the alternative percentage-based liability under Rule 6(3)(i).

Issues: Whether imported laser imagers are classifiable as other diagnostic instruments or apparatus under CTH 9018 90 19, or as residual accessories under CTH 9033 00 00.

Analysis: The laser imager has no independent diagnostic capability and merely prints data received from diagnostic equipment; it is therefore an accessory rather than a diagnostic instrument or apparatus. Under Note 2(b) of Chapter 90, an accessory is classifiable with a machine only where it is suitable solely or principally for a particular kind of machine or for machines falling under the same tariff heading. The laser imagers were compatible not only with machines under CTH 9018 but also with equipment under CTH 9022. Consequently, they could not be classified with machines under a single tariff heading under Note 2(b), and the residual rule in Note 2(c) applied.

Conclusion: The laser imagers are classifiable under CTH 9033 00 00 as accessories not specified or included elsewhere in Chapter 90, and not under CTH 9018 90 19. The finding is against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether acceptance of examination findings by a Customs Broker, without proof of authority from the importer, established the importer's acceptance of the reclassification and revaluation; (ii) Whether the reclassification, revaluation, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty were sustainable on the evidence available.

Issue (i): Whether acceptance of examination findings by a Customs Broker, without proof of authority from the importer, established the importer's acceptance of the reclassification and revaluation.

Analysis: The examination was attended by the Customs Broker and a Chartered Engineer, but no authority authorising the Customs Broker to accept classification or valuation on the importer's behalf was produced. No provision under the Customs Broker licensing regime was identified as conferring such authority. The importer could therefore not be treated as having been present during examination or as having accepted the departmental findings.

Conclusion: The purported acceptance by the Customs Broker did not bind the importer; the principles of natural justice were violated, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reclassification, revaluation, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty were sustainable on the evidence available.

Analysis: The finding that part of the consignment comprised steel coils was reached without specialist opinion, testing or market enquiry. The material was imported for melting, and the claim that the alleged coils were defective and damaged and incapable of use as such was not disproved. The evidentiary basis was consequently insufficient to establish incorrect classification or declared value.

Conclusion: No misdeclaration of classification or value was established; confiscation and the consequential redemption fine and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The importer's declared treatment of the goods prevailed, and the adverse fiscal consequences founded on the departmental examination findings were nullified.

Ratio Decidendi: An importer cannot be bound by a Customs Broker's acceptance of classification or valuation absent authority, and adverse reclassification or valuation findings require reliable evidentiary support.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent-firm's registration was proved so as to avoid the bar under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; (ii) Whether the suit for recovery on unpaid invoices was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent-firm's registration was proved so as to avoid the bar under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Analysis: The memorandum issued by the Registrar of Firms recorded the filing, recording and registration of the firm and disclosed its registration number and date. The certified Form-VIII produced at the appellate stage corroborated those particulars. The additional document was properly received since it enabled a just adjudication and confirmed the existing documentary proof.

Conclusion: The respondent-firm's registration was validly proved; the suit was not barred under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. This issue is in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit for recovery on unpaid invoices was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The claim rested on individual invoices, not a running account. The communication relied on did not acknowledge the invoices sued upon; it admitted and paid only specified bills, while disputing the remaining demand. Proceedings for winding up were distinct from a civil recovery action and could not extend the limitation period for the suit. Even assuming exclusion of time spent in the company proceeding, the company petition itself had been filed after expiry of limitation for the relevant bills; the suit was also instituted after limitation had expired for the remaining unpaid invoices.

Conclusion: The recovery claim was barred by limitation. This issue is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Although the respondent-firm was competent to institute the suit, no monetary recovery could be granted because the invoice-based claim was time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: A winding-up proceeding does not suspend or extend limitation for an independent suit for recovery, and payment of separately admitted invoices does not amount to acknowledgment or part payment of disputed invoice claims.

Issues: (i) Whether the EPC contract was frustrated by efflux of time; (ii) Whether the amounts claimed under the EPC contract constituted operational debt; (iii) Whether a pre-existing dispute barred the insolvency application; and (iv) Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the EPC contract was frustrated by efflux of time.

Analysis: The contractual termination provisions made termination elective and subject to stipulated notices. Neither party terminated the contract, and suspension due to non-payment did not amount to termination. Efflux of time concerns the natural expiry of a contract, whereas frustration under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 requires an unforeseen supervening impossibility. A suspension resulting from the parties' own non-performance is not such an impossibility, and time was not stipulated to be of the essence.

Conclusion: The EPC contract was not frustrated by efflux of time and continued to subsist.

Issue (ii): Whether the amounts claimed under the EPC contract constituted operational debt.

Analysis: Amounts payable under the contractual payment schedule were consideration for goods and works supplied under the EPC contract and consequently fell within operational debt. Suspension, idling and demobilization charges arose from the alleged contractual breach and were damages; such damages do not become operational debt unless assessed and crystallised by a competent forum.

Conclusion: Contractual milestone payments qualified as operational debt, but the claims for suspension, idling and demobilization charges did not qualify as operational debt unless adjudicated and crystallised.

Issue (iii): Whether a pre-existing dispute barred the insolvency application.

Analysis: A Section 9 application is barred only by a genuine, pre-existing dispute, which need not have culminated in litigation or arbitration but must be evidenced by conduct or communications. The corporate debtor did not respond to the repeated legal notices or the statutory demand notice and raised its defence only in response to the insolvency application. Its total and consistent silence was material evidence that no genuine dispute existed at the relevant time.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute existed to bar the Section 9 application.

Issue (iv): Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Under Sections 3(12) and 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, read with Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation runs from the date on which the debt became due and payable and default occurred. Each invoice or payment default has its own limitation period; continued subsistence of the contract does not create a continuing cause of action for an accrued default. The liabilities were acknowledged in January and February 2012, but the insolvency application was not pursued within three years. Legal notices issued by the creditor could not reset limitation, since Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a written acknowledgment by the party against whom the claim is made.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application was time-barred because the defaults occurred more than three years before its filing and no valid acknowledgment or condonation extended limitation.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency admission could not stand because the operational-debt claim invoked for insolvency was barred by limitation, notwithstanding that the EPC contract subsisted and no pre-existing dispute was established.

Ratio Decidendi: For a Section 9 insolvency application, limitation runs separately from the date each operational debt becomes due and unpaid; subsistence of the underlying contract and unilateral creditor notices do not create a continuing cause of action or extend limitation without a valid acknowledgment by the debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether transport services could be classified as Goods Transport Agency services where the service provider issued bills rather than documents specifically titled consignment notes; (ii) Whether service-tax demands founded solely on Form 26AS and other income-tax records, invoking the extended limitation period, were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether transport services could be classified as Goods Transport Agency services where the service provider issued bills rather than documents specifically titled consignment notes.

Analysis: Section 65(50b) of the Finance Act, 1994 defines a Goods Transport Agency as a person providing road transport of goods and issuing a consignment note "by whatever name called". No prescribed nomenclature or format is required; the substance and contents of the document evidencing carriage are material. Bills containing the essential particulars of transportation may therefore constitute consignment notes. Certificates issued by service recipients confirming receipt of GTA services and discharge of tax under reverse charge were reliable evidence of the nature of the services.

Conclusion: The services were GTA services, and classification could not be denied merely because bills, rather than documents expressly titled consignment notes, were issued. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demands founded solely on Form 26AS and other income-tax records, invoking the extended limitation period, were sustainable.

Analysis: Form 26AS and income-tax financial records are not statutory determinants of taxable turnover for service-tax purposes. The demands were raised without verification of books of account, invoices, or the underlying transactions. Further, the assessee regularly filed ST-3 returns and the Department possessed the relevant information when the first show-cause notice was issued. The same or similar facts could not subsequently support an allegation of suppression for invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The demands based solely on Form 26AS and confirmed by invoking the extended limitation period were unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax confirmations, interest, and penalties founded on the disputed differential turnover could not stand.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty paid for a licence to pre-install and sub-license operating software before 16.05.2008 was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether royalty paid for a licence to pre-install and sub-license operating software before 16.05.2008 was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service.

Analysis: Intellectual Property Right Service applied only to rights in specified or similarly recognised intangible property under Indian law, while copyright was expressly excluded. The notice and the adjudication did not identify or establish any recognised intellectual property right other than the copyright in the software. The licence granted a right to pre-install the copyrighted software and to sub-license its use with the computers; it did not alter the copyright character of the right. The specific levy on commercial exploitation of information technology software, including reproduction, distribution and sale, was introduced only from 16.05.2008, confirming that the activity was not covered under the pre-existing Intellectual Property Right Service entry.

Conclusion: The software licence was not taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service for the period before 16.05.2008, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Analysis: The departmental audit and subsequent correspondence had disclosed the relevant activity to the Department within the normal limitation period. Bona fide dispute over taxability, coupled with such disclosure, did not establish suppression with intent to evade payment. Further, any reverse-charge tax paid would have been available as Cenvat credit for manufacture of dutiable computers, creating a revenue-neutral position inconsistent with an intent to evade.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand, and consequently the related interest and penalties, could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A licence concerning copyrighted software cannot be taxed under the pre-16.05.2008 Intellectual Property Right Service entry where copyright is excluded and no other recognised intellectual property right is identified; extended limitation is unavailable absent suppression with intent to evade, particularly where the transaction is revenue neutral.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order could be sustained where, after cancellation of GST registration, the show-cause notice was made available only on the GST portal and no effective opportunity of personal hearing was afforded.

Analysis: Section 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits multiple modes of service and portal-based communication is not the exclusive means where the registration had been cancelled. Effective service must reasonably communicate the notice to the taxable person. Section 75(4) requires a personal hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated, embodying the requirement of audi alteram partem. The undisputed facts were governed by the adopted precedent concerning invalid portal-only service following cancellation of registration.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for want of valid service and the required opportunity of personal hearing; the petitioner was entitled to submit a reply and have the matter freshly adjudicated in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy against the ex parte GST adjudication order while being afforded protective directions.

Analysis: Although an appeal was available under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the medical exigencies substantiated by the record and the substantial tax, interest and penalty imposed established a prima facie case for protective intervention. Relegation to the appellate forum without such protection would cause prejudice. The merits of the input tax credit demand and the validity of the ex parte adjudication were left for independent determination in appeal.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to pursue the statutory appeal upon complying with the prescribed pre-deposit and payment of costs; the appellate authority must entertain and decide the appeal independently and expeditiously.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders passed after the assessee did not respond to portal-issued show cause notices should be set aside to permit a reply and fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The notices in DRC-01 had not been answered, while the assessee sought an opportunity to place its merits and supporting documents before the assessing authority and agreed to make a specified deposit. A meaningful opportunity to respond to the notices and substantiate the case warranted fresh consideration, with the deposit operating as a condition for that relief.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders were set aside, conditional upon payment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the stipulated instalments and filing a reply with supporting documents; the assessing authority must thereafter make a fresh merits determination after notice.