Disciplinary punishment proportionality limits judicial review where misconduct is serious and dismissal is not shockingly excessive.

Disciplinary punishment may be interfered with in judicial review only when it is outrageously disproportionate to the misconduct and shocks the conscience of the Court. The Court reiterated that it is not an appellate authority over departmental penalties and cannot reduce punishment merely because another view is possible. Applying that standard, dismissal of a Major in the Indian Army for a false transport claim and conduct unbecoming of an officer was treated as proportionate, given the seriousness of the misconduct and the high standard of honesty expected of the rank. No interference with the penalty was warranted.

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Issues: Whether the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant for proved misconduct was so disproportionate to the gravity of the charges as to warrant interference in judicial review.

Analysis: The governing principle is that punishment in disciplinary matters must be commensurate with the misconduct, and judicial review may interfere only where the penalty is outrageously disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. The Court reiterated that it is not an appellate authority over departmental punishment and cannot substitute a lesser penalty merely because another view is possible. Applying that standard, the appellant, a Major in the Indian Army, was found guilty of making a false claim for transport charges and of conduct unbecoming of an officer. The misconduct was treated as serious, bordering on moral turpitude, and the rank held by the appellant called for a high standard of honesty and rectitude.

Conclusion: The punishment of dismissal from service was not held to be disproportionate and no interference was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: In disciplinary matters, judicial review of punishment is confined to cases where the penalty is so disproportionate to the misconduct as to be outrageously arbitrary or shocking to conscience, and the Court will not substitute its own view on quantum of punishment.

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