Retrospective amendment and money-laundering attachment: later filing of the complaint did not undo a prior confirmation order.

An amendment introducing a 90-day limit for filing a prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act did not retrospectively affect a confirmation order passed before the amendment, because no express legislative intent showed that prior confirmations were to be undone and the pre-amendment regime continued to govern. The later filing of the prosecution complaint during pendency of the appeal also did not render the challenge infructuous, as the attached properties remained relevant for confiscation in the pending proceedings and release would defeat the object of preserving them. The challenge to confirmation of attachment therefore failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the amendment introducing a 90-day limit for filing the prosecution complaint under section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 applied to a confirmation order passed before the amendment came into force; (ii) Whether the subsequent filing of the prosecution complaint during pendency of the appeal rendered the challenge to confirmation of attachment infructuous or liable to be rejected.

Issue (i): Whether the amendment introducing a 90-day limit for filing the prosecution complaint under section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 applied to a confirmation order passed before the amendment came into force.

Analysis: The attachment was confirmed before the amendment took effect. The amended provision was intended to regulate timely filing of the prosecution complaint, but the amendment did not expressly deal with prior attachment or confirmation orders. In the absence of any clear indication of retrospective operation, the pre-amendment regime continued to govern the confirmation order, and the right that had accrued to the enforcement agency under the unamended provision could not be taken away by the later amendment.

Conclusion: This issue was answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent filing of the prosecution complaint during pendency of the appeal rendered the challenge to confirmation of attachment infructuous or liable to be rejected.

Analysis: The prosecution complaint had already been filed and the attached properties were included for the purpose of confiscation in the pending money-laundering proceedings. Releasing the properties at that stage would defeat the object of preserving property for trial and possible confiscation. The attachment had therefore not become incapable of consideration merely because the complaint was filed later during the appeal.

Conclusion: This issue was answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the confirmation of attachment failed, and the appeal was not allowed on the asserted grounds of parity or subsequent amendment.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment introducing a time limit for filing a prosecution complaint does not, without express retrospective intent, undo a confirmation order already passed under the earlier regime, and a pending money-laundering appeal does not become infructuous merely because the prosecution complaint is later filed and the attached property is included for confiscation.

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