2025 (2) TMI 1336 - SC - Indian Laws

Revisional jurisdiction over discharge orders and limits on ex-parte stays, endorsing Section 390 bail directions as safeguard

Revisional jurisdiction over orders of discharge requires that interim relief be truly ancillary to final relief; an ex-parte stay of a discharge which ... Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court - Power to stay an order of discharge - Effect of discharge and status of a discharged person - Limits on ex-parte interim interference with liberty - Power to arrest/commit or admit to bail pending challenge to acquittal/discharge - Doctrine that bail is the rule and jail the exception - HELD THAT:- The grant of stay to the order of discharge amounts to the grant of final relief, as the trial can proceed against him. An interim order can be granted pending disposal of the main case only if the interim order is in the aid of final relief sought in the main case. If the discharge order is ultimately set aside by grant of final relief in the revision, the accused has to face the trial. Therefore, the order staying the order of discharge by way of interim relief cannot be said to be in the aid of final relief. When a revision application challenging the order of discharge is admitted for hearing, the High Court may exercise power under Section 390 by directing the person discharged to appear before the Trial Court and by directing the Trial Court to admit him to bail on appropriate terms and conditions. If such an order is passed after the admission of the revision application against the order of discharge, it is a sufficient safeguard for ensuring the presence of the discharged accused at the time of hearing of the revision application and for undergoing trial, if the order of discharge is set aside. If the discharge order is eventually set aside, such an order under Section 390 of the CrPC passed in an admitted revision application against the discharge order will be in the aid of final relief. As held earlier, while exercising power under Section 390 of the CrPC, the normal rule is that the acquitted accused should not be committed to custody, and a direction should be issued to admit him to bail. This normal rule should apply all the more to cases where the challenge is to the order of discharge, as the order of discharge is on a higher pedestal than an order of acquittal. Passing an order under Section 390 directing the discharged accused to admit to bail is sufficient to procure the presence of the discharged accused at the time of hearing of the revision application and for undergoing trial if the order of discharge is set aside. The first impugned order has been passed ex-parte while issuing notice by which the order of discharge was stayed. There is nothing placed on record to show that till the second impugned order was passed, at any time, the High Court had given an opportunity to the appellant to be heard on the prayer for stay. The second impugned order runs into as many as twenty-six pages and involves 62 paragraphs, which, in substance, holds that as the order of discharge was no longer operative, the status of the appellant as an accused has been restored, and therefore, he shall be forthwith taken into custody. In our view, the ex-parte order of stay of the order of discharge should not have been passed by the High Court. The consequences of such an order are very drastic as alluded to hereinabove. Hence, the ex-parte order of stay is entirely illegal. Consequently, the second impugned order deserves to be set aside. The bail bonds furnished by the appellant in terms of the order dated 20th October 2023 were for ensuring his presence when notice of the proceedings against an order of discharge is served. Thus, the validity of the bail bonds may have expired. Hence, we propose to direct the appellant to furnish bail in terms of Section 390 of the CrPC. The impugned orders are, hereby, quashed and set aside. Appeals are allowed on the terms and conditions. Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC (and powers derivable from Section 390 CrPC), could stay an order of discharge and direct the appellant to surrender to custody pending disposal of the revision application.Analysis: Revisional powers under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC permit the High Court to call for records and to exercise powers of an Appellate Court, including those under Section 390 CrPC. A discharge under Section 227 CrPC is passed when there is no sufficient ground to proceed and removes the person from the status of an accused; it therefore stands on a higher pedestal than an acquittal or an order granting bail. An order staying a discharge is a drastic step that effectively nullifies the liberty restored by discharge and allows trial proceedings to continue. Interim relief must be in aid of the final relief sought; staying a discharge ordinarily is not so and can amount to granting final relief by interim order. Only in rare and exceptional cases, where the discharge is ex facie perverse or a very strong prima facie case for deprivation of liberty is made out, can a revisional Court stay a discharge. Where interim custody or arrest is ordered in proceedings challenging a discharge, the power under Section 390 CrPC should, as a norm, require admission to bail with appropriate conditions rather than commitment to prison. Ex parte stays of discharge are impermissible as a standard rule without hearing the discharged person, and any interim order must be suitably moulded to protect the liberty interest and avoid making the revisions final outcome a fait accompli.Conclusion: The ex parte stay of the discharge and the order directing surrender and custody were unlawful and are quashed; the revision shall proceed afresh and the appellant is entitled to furnish bail as directed until disposal of the revision application (resulting in allowance of the appeals in favour of the appellant).