Official duty immunity applies only to acts within statutory scope; assault allegations against a customs officer could proceed.

Statutory notice under the Sea Customs Act did not apply because the alleged assault and detention were not acts done in pursuance of customs duties; the lawful power was seizure and production before the competent authority, not summary punishment by beating, so the notice objection failed. Prior sanction under the Criminal Procedure Code was also unnecessary because sanction protects only acts done or purportedly done in discharge of official duty, and a common offence does not gain that protection merely because a public servant is involved. The complaint could not be rejected at the cognizance stage, and the prosecution was allowed to proceed before the Magistrate.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 198 of the Sea Customs Act barred the complaint for want of notice. (ii) Whether Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code barred cognizance of the complaint and required prior sanction.

Issue (i): Whether Section 198 of the Sea Customs Act barred the complaint for want of notice.

Analysis: The protection under the section applies only to things done or purported to be done in pursuance of the Act. The alleged assault and detention of the complainant were not acts within the statutory functions of a Customs Inspector. The lawful course under the Act was seizure and production before the competent authority, not summary punishment by beating a person. An act outside official duty does not attract the statutory notice requirement.

Conclusion: Section 198 of the Sea Customs Act did not bar the complaint, and the objection based on absence of notice failed.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code barred cognizance of the complaint and required prior sanction.

Analysis: Sanction is necessary only when the act complained of is done or purported to be done in discharge of official duty, or within the scope of such duty. A common offence does not acquire protection merely because it is alleged against a public servant. Whether the alleged assault was committed and, if so, whether it was connected with any lawful use of force in official duty, was a mixed question of fact and law requiring inquiry. The complaint could not be thrown out at the threshold. Even otherwise, a Customs Inspector removable by a delegated authority did not fall within the category requiring Central Government sanction on the footing urged.

Conclusion: Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not bar the prosecution at the stage of cognizance, and the sanction objection failed.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the complaint was unsustainable, and the matter was directed to proceed before the Magistrate in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory protection for public servants applies only to acts done or purported to be done within the scope of official duty, and a common offence outside that scope does not require prior sanction or statutory notice.

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