Contempt by letter to a judge: deliberate imputations and threats upheld, while a belated apology only reduced punishment.

A deliberate letter sent to a judge seized of a pending matter, alleging unlawful conduct and attacking judicial impartiality, was held to constitute contempt because it directly threatened the administration of justice. A belated apology was treated as mitigating only on sentence: it was not frank or timely enough to wipe out liability, though it helped avoid imprisonment. The statutory bar in Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 was held inapplicable because it did not extend to the kind of contempt under consideration. The reference succeeded, contempt was affirmed, and punishment was imposed by fine.

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Issues: (i) Whether the letter addressed to a judge seised of the case constituted contempt of court; (ii) Whether a belated apology could reduce or avert punishment; (iii) Whether Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 barred the proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the letter addressed to a judge seised of the case constituted contempt of court.

Analysis: The communication contained an express imputation that the judge had acted unlawfully and with a view to causing loss, together with a threat and an attack on judicial impartiality. It was sent deliberately by registered post while the court was still seised of the matter. Such conduct was treated as a serious affront to the administration of justice and not as a mere emotional outburst.

Conclusion: The letter amounted to contempt of court.

Issue (ii): Whether a belated apology could reduce or avert punishment.

Analysis: An apology was not offered at the earliest stage and was not made before the injured judge in the lower court. The apology tendered through counsel was accepted only to the limited extent of bearing on sentence, but it was not treated as full expiation. The Court held that an apology must be frank, unconditional, and timely to carry real weight.

Conclusion: The belated apology mitigated the punishment only to the extent of avoiding imprisonment, but it did not absolve the contemner.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 barred the proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory bar was held to relate to offences punishable as contempt under the Penal Code and not to offences punishable otherwise than as contempt. On that footing, the provision did not prevent the Court from dealing with the present contempt.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not barred by Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926.

Final Conclusion: The reference succeeded, the contempt was affirmed, and the contemner was punished with a fine in place of imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi: A deliberate communication to a judge seised of a pending matter, containing threats or imputations against judicial integrity, constitutes contempt; a belated or qualified apology may affect sentence but does not erase liability, and the statutory bar in Section 2(3) does not apply where the offence is not one punishable as contempt under the Penal Code.

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