Communicated customs demand required for limitation; unserved notice cannot support recovery of short-levied duty.

Recovery of short-levied customs duty under Section 39 of the Sea Customs Act depended on a demand being made within the prescribed period, and a demand was effective only when communicated to the person liable. Mere preparation, internal issue, or proof that notices were issued was insufficient where service was not shown. The later statutory change substituting "issued" for "made" reinforced that, at the relevant time, communication of the demand was required. On the stated facts, the demand was barred by limitation and the unserved demand letters were invalid.

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Issues: Whether the additional customs duty demand under Section 39 of the Sea Customs Act was barred by limitation for want of a demand being made within the prescribed period.

Analysis: Section 39 treated recovery of short-levied customs duty as dependent on a demand being made within the statutory period. A demand was not complete unless it was communicated to the person liable; mere preparation or internal issue of a demand letter was insufficient. On the facts, the asserted demand notices were shown only as having been issued, not served, and no records establishing communication were produced. The later amendment substituting the word "issued" for "made" supported the conclusion that, at the relevant time, service or communication of the demand was necessary.

Conclusion: The demand for additional duty was barred by limitation and the impugned demand letters were invalid.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded, and the customs authorities were restrained from enforcing the additional duty demand.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute requires a demand to be made within a specified period for recovery of short-levied duty, the demand is effective only when communicated to the person liable, and an unserved or merely issued notice does not satisfy the statutory requirement.

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