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Issues: Whether the delay of 1259 days in filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was rightly condoned on the basis of the accused's repeated assurances, acknowledgements of liability, and the surrounding correspondence and conduct.
Analysis: Condonation of delay depends on the sufficiency of the cause shown, and length of delay is not decisive by itself. Where the court of first instance has positively exercised discretion to condone delay, a superior court ordinarily should not interfere unless the discretion is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or untenable. In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the nature of the proceeding is quasi-criminal, but the delay question must still be assessed in the context of the statutory scheme, the conduct of the parties, and the balance between the complainant's opportunity to pursue the remedy and the accused's right to a fair and speedy trial. On the facts, the material showed repeated assurances, acknowledgements of liability, a subsequent memorandum of understanding, and other communications which prima facie supported the complainant's case that he was induced to forbear from filing the complaint in time.
Conclusion: The condonation of delay was justified, and no ground was made out to interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the courts below. The challenge to the condonation failed.