Limitation on revisional duty demands bars recovery where a classification change also directs differential excise duty.

A revisional order that changes the classification of polyester film and directs recovery of differential excise duty is treated in substance as a duty-demand order, so it falls under the limitation period governing duty recovery rather than the general revisional period. Because the revision notice was issued beyond six months from the original classification order, the proceeding was time-barred and the revisional order was unsustainable. The amended revisional provision could apply to orders made before the amendment, so earlier orders were not outside jurisdiction merely for that reason; however, that power remained subject to statutory limitation, which was not satisfied here. The impugned revisional order was quashed and the original classification restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Collector's revisional order, which altered the classification of polyester film and directed recovery of differential duty, was barred by limitation under the excise law; (ii) whether the Collector could exercise revisional power in respect of an order passed before the amendment that introduced such power.

Issue (i): Whether the Collector's revisional order, which altered the classification of polyester film and directed recovery of differential duty, was barred by limitation under the excise law.

Analysis: The revised classification did not merely change an abstract entry; the operative direction required the Assistant Collector to compute and recover the differential duty. Such an order, in substance, resulted in levy or enhancement of duty and the demand for payment of duty allegedly short-levied. Orders of that character fall within the limitation framework governing duty recovery, not the general revisional period. Since the notice initiating revision was issued more than six months after the original classification order, the proceeding was beyond the prescribed time.

Conclusion: The revisional order was barred by limitation and was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the Collector could exercise revisional power in respect of an order passed before the amendment that introduced such power.

Analysis: The amended revisional provision expressly covered orders passed before or after the commencement of the amending Act, indicating that the power could extend to earlier orders. The jurisdiction was therefore not excluded merely because the original classification order predated the amendment. However, that jurisdiction remained subject to the statutory limitation period, which was not satisfied here.

Conclusion: The Collector had jurisdiction in principle to revise earlier orders, but not in this case because the proceeding was time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The impugned revisional order was quashed and the original classification order was restored, with the assessee obtaining relief on the question of duty recovery.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a revisional order altering classification also directs recovery of differential excise duty, it is governed by the limitation applicable to duty demand proceedings, and revisional power over earlier orders can be exercised only within the statutory time limit.

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