Retrospective criminal liability barred where a penal deeming provision creates substantive liability without express legislative indication.

A penal deeming provision creating company-related criminal liability was analysed as prospective only, because its text and amending history showed no express intention to operate backwards. The provision could not be applied to conduct alleged to have been completed in 1983, as retrospective use would impose punishment for an act that was not liable when done and would offend the constitutional bar on ex post facto criminal legislation. An argument based on conspiracy and continuing offence also failed, because the alleged breaches were complete within the stated period and the Indian Penal Code conspiracy charge did not extend the Salt Act amendment.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether Section 9AA of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, introduced on 27-12-1985, could be applied retrospectively to offences alleged to have been committed in 1983; (ii) whether the allegation of conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code could sustain the application of Section 9AA on the basis of a continuing offence.

Issue (i): Whether Section 9AA of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, introduced on 27-12-1985, could be applied retrospectively to offences alleged to have been committed in 1983.

Analysis: The provision creates criminal liability by deeming persons in charge of the company to be guilty along with the company. It does not merely regulate procedure or shift the burden of proof. Its language does not express retrospectivity, and the amending enactment does not disclose any indication that it was intended to operate backwards. Applying it to conduct completed before its introduction would attach penal consequences to an act that was innocent when done and would offend the constitutional protection against ex post facto criminal legislation.

Conclusion: Section 9AA could not be given retrospective effect and therefore could not be invoked for the alleged 1983 offences.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegation of conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code could sustain the application of Section 9AA on the basis of a continuing offence.

Analysis: The alleged breaches were complete within the period 10-7-1983 to 12-7-1983, and the factual material did not show a continuing offence. Section 9AA operates only in relation to offences under the Salt Act and does not extend to a charge under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The plea of continuity therefore did not furnish a basis for applying the amendment.

Conclusion: The continuing-offence argument failed and could not justify adding Section 9AA to the complaint.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the magistrate's order succeeded because the amendment introducing company liability was held to be prospective only, and the order permitting its addition was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: A penal deeming provision that creates substantive criminal liability cannot be applied retrospectively in the absence of express legislative indication, because doing so would contravene Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.

---