Writ interference at show cause stage is limited where excise jurisdiction and manufacture depend on factual determination.

A writ petition under Article 226 is ordinarily not maintainable against an excise show cause notice unless the notice on its face reveals total lack of jurisdiction or a proceeding that is prima facie void. Where jurisdiction depends on facts and evidence, the High Court should not interfere at the threshold and should leave objections to the issuing authority. On manufacture, Section 2(f) and Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 25 make the issue fact-specific, so crushing limestone into smaller pieces could not be ruled out as manufacture at the notice stage. The notices were therefore left to be decided by the excise authority in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable at the stage of a show cause notice alleging contravention of excise law, and (ii) whether crushing limestone into smaller pieces amounted to manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act read with Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 25 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Issue (i): whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable at the stage of a show cause notice alleging contravention of excise law.

Analysis: Interference at the notice stage is ordinarily unwarranted because objections can be raised before the issuing authority. Interference is justified only where the notice on its face discloses a total lack of jurisdiction or a proceeding that is prima facie null and void. If the question of jurisdiction depends upon examination of facts and evidence, the High Court should not quash the notice at the threshold.

Conclusion: The challenge to the show cause notice was premature and not maintainable at the threshold.

Issue (ii): whether crushing limestone into smaller pieces amounted to manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act read with Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 25 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: Section 2(f) contains an inclusive definition of manufacture, and Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 25 treats specified physical processes as falling within the statutory scheme. Whether a particular process amounts to manufacture must be determined on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court declined to hold, on the face of the notice, that crushing limestone could never amount to manufacture or that the authority lacked jurisdiction to examine the question.

Conclusion: The question whether the process amounted to manufacture could not be decided against the authority at the notice stage.

Final Conclusion: The show cause notices were not liable to be quashed in writ jurisdiction, and the proceedings were left to be decided by the excise authority in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A show cause notice in excise matters will not be quashed under Article 226 unless it is shown on the face of the notice that the authority lacks jurisdiction; where the applicability of the statutory definition of manufacture depends on factual determination, the writ court should not intervene at the notice stage.

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