Strict construction of exemption notifications: "same" trade mark cannot mean "similar", and writ relief remained available.

In construing a fiscal exemption notification, the word "same" in the phrase relating to trade mark or brand name must be given its plain meaning and cannot be expanded to cover "similar" or "deceptively similar" marks by borrowing concepts from trade mark law. On the facts, the six units were not shown to be using one and the same trade mark or brand name, so the individual exemption under Notification No. 148/82-C.E. was available. The alternative remedy objection also failed because writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary, the dispute raised a pure question of interpretation, and no disputed facts required adjudication.

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Issues: (i) Whether aerated waters manufactured by the six units were covered by the expression "common trade mark aerated waters" under Notification No. 148/82-C.E., dated 22-4-1982, so as to deny individual exemption; (ii) whether the writ petitions were not maintainable for failure to exhaust the alternative statutory remedy.

Issue (i): Whether aerated waters manufactured by the six units were covered by the expression "common trade mark aerated waters" under Notification No. 148/82-C.E., dated 22-4-1982, so as to deny individual exemption.

Analysis: The notification granted exemption where aerated waters were not manufactured with the same trade mark or brand name in more than one factory, and the relevant language used the word "same". The Court held that "same" could not be expanded to include "similar", "deceptively similar", or "deceptively identical". In a fiscal notification, the language must be strictly construed, and no importation of concepts drawn from trade mark law was permissible to enlarge the scope of the exemption. On the facts, the units were not shown to be using one and the same trade mark or brand name for the purpose of the notification.

Conclusion: The six units were not manufacturers of aerated waters under a common trade mark or brand name, and they were entitled to individual exemption under Notification No. 148/82-C.E.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petitions were not maintainable for failure to exhaust the alternative statutory remedy.

Analysis: The rule regarding alternative remedy is one of discretion and self-restraint, not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The dispute turned on interpretation of the exemption notification and did not require investigation of disputed facts. Since the writ petitions had been entertained and heard on merits, and the issue raised an important question of law, the Court held that it would not be to non-suit the petitioners at the appellate stage on the ground of alternative remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable, and the objection based on alternative remedy failed.

Final Conclusion: The exemption order could not be disturbed, as the units were not shown to be using the same trade mark or brand name within the meaning of the notification, and the writ remedy was properly entertained on the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: In construing a fiscal exemption notification, the expression used in the notification must be given its plain meaning, and "same" cannot be read as "similar" or "deceptively similar"; the existence of an alternative remedy does not, by itself, bar writ jurisdiction where the dispute is one of pure interpretation and no disputed facts require adjudication.

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