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Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the accused failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139, and whether the trial court erred in treating the defence as sufficient rebuttal.
Analysis: Once the cheque, signature, dishonour, and service of statutory notice were established, the presumption under Section 139 arose in favour of the complainant, including the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The accused was required to rebut that presumption by a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial was insufficient, and the absence of any reply to the statutory notice strengthened the complainant's case. The material elicited in cross-examination did not constitute a probable defence, nor did it displace the statutory presumption. The trial court, instead of applying the reverse onus, wrongly placed the burden on the complainant and recorded findings that were perverse and contrary to settled law governing appeals against acquittal.
Conclusion: The acquittal could not be sustained. The presumption under Section 139 stood unrebutted, and the finding of the trial court was liable to be interfered with. The conviction under Section 138 was warranted.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, once issuance and dishonour of the cheque and service of notice are proved, the presumption of legally enforceable debt arises under Section 139 and can be rebutted only by a probable defence established on a preponderance of probabilities, including from the complainant's own evidence.