Provisional excise assessment and differential duty demand upheld where prior representation was heard and statutory appeal was available.

Provisional excise assessments may be completed by the proper officer through a formal demand for differential duty where the earlier quantification process was only preparatory and had not resulted in a final adjudication. The court noted that the assessee had already replied to the show cause notices, participated in the earlier adjudication and subsequent duty-calculation meetings, so no further pre-demand notice was required and no prejudice was shown. It also held that writ interference was inappropriate because an effective statutory appeal remedy was available under the excise law. The demand process was therefore upheld, with no breach of natural justice found.

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Issues: (i) whether the demand of differential excise duty issued on 28 April 1988 was without jurisdiction because the working out of duty in the Calcutta meetings and the Superintendent's endorsement had already concluded the matter; (ii) whether the impugned demand was vitiated for want of opportunity and breach of natural justice; (iii) whether the writ petition should be entertained despite the statutory appeal remedy under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

Issue (i): whether the demand of differential excise duty issued on 28 April 1988 was without jurisdiction because the working out of duty in the Calcutta meetings and the Superintendent's endorsement had already concluded the matter.

Analysis: The earlier order of the Director General required the proper officer to finalise the provisional assessments and then issue a formal demand for differential duty. The Calcutta meetings were found to be only part of the working process for quantification. The documents relied upon by the petitioner did not bear the signature of the Assistant Collector and did not amount to a final demand or a final adjudication of liability. The court held that the Director General's order had not exhausted itself and that the Assistant Collector, as the proper officer, was required to issue the final demand order.

Conclusion: The impugned demand was not without jurisdiction and was validly issued in pursuance of the earlier final order.

Issue (ii): whether the impugned demand was vitiated for want of opportunity and breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 11A required consideration of the assessee's representation before determination of duty. The petitioner had already replied to the show cause notices, was heard in the earlier adjudication, and was again involved in the subsequent meetings where the duty calculations were discussed. The court found that the relevant data and calculations were placed before the authorities and that no further pre-demand notice was necessary before issuing the formal demand. No prejudice was shown.

Conclusion: There was no violation of natural justice and the demand was not void on that ground.

Issue (iii): whether the writ petition should be entertained despite the statutory appeal remedy under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

Analysis: An appeal lay to the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) under Section 35, with wide powers under Section 35A to confirm, modify, annul, or remand the order and to record reasons. The court held that the questions raised, including whether the demand was contrary to the earlier order, were matters for the appellate authority and not for writ adjudication in the face of an efficacious alternate remedy.

Conclusion: The petition was not maintainable on the merits of the demand because an effective statutory appeal remedy was available.

Final Conclusion: The court upheld the demand process, found no breach of natural justice, and declined to interfere in writ jurisdiction because the petitioner had an adequate appellate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: Where provisional excise assessments remain to be finally completed by the proper officer, a formal demand issued thereafter is valid if the assessee has already had a statutory opportunity to represent its case, and writ relief will ordinarily not be granted against such a demand when an efficacious statutory appeal lies.

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