Power of attorney evidence in cheque dishonour cases requires direct knowledge; hearsay alone cannot sustain the statutory presumption.

In a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a power of attorney holder may support the complaint only if he has witnessed the transaction as an agent or otherwise has direct knowledge, and that knowledge is specifically pleaded. Here, the witness admitted in cross-examination that his knowledge was only hearsay and the complaint did not establish his personal knowledge of the transaction or cheque execution. On that basis, the foundational facts were not proved, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 could not be effectively invoked, and the acquittal was justified.

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Issues: Whether the complainant proved the transaction and execution of the cheque through the power of attorney holder, and whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act called for interference.

Analysis: A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act may be presented and supported by a power of attorney holder, but such witness can depose only if he has witnessed the transaction as an agent or otherwise possesses due knowledge of the transaction. Specific assertion of such knowledge must be made in the complaint. Here, the power of attorney holder repeatedly stated in cross-examination that his knowledge was only hearsay, and the complaint did not show that he had witnessed the transaction. In these circumstances, the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 could not be effectively invoked on the strength of his evidence alone, and the complainant failed to prove the foundational facts.

Conclusion: The acquittal was justified and the appeal was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A power of attorney holder in a cheque dishonour prosecution can prove the complaint only when he has direct knowledge of the transaction or has witnessed it as an agent, and hearsay evidence without specific pleading of such knowledge is insufficient to establish the foundational facts for the statutory presumption.

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