Issues: Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal must comply with the prescribed timeline for pronouncement of orders after conclusion of hearing.

Analysis: Rule 34 requires an order to be pronounced within 60 days where no pronouncement date is given, with a further period not ordinarily exceeding 30 days only where exceptional and extraordinary circumstances make timely pronouncement impracticable. Releasing matters without pronouncing judgment after they have been argued and reserved repeatedly imposes unjustified litigation hardship. The Tribunal must fix a pronouncement date and adhere to the 60-day period, or at the latest the 90-day outer period in exceptional cases.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was directed to deliver the judgment in the petitioner's pending appeal by 13 August 2026, and all Income Tax Appellate Tribunals were directed to scrupulously comply with Rule 34.

Issues: Whether a reassessment completed without first disposing of the assessee's objections to the recorded reopening reasons through a separate speaking order is legally valid.

Analysis: The additional jurisdictional ground was admitted because it arose from the existing record and required no fresh factual inquiry. The record showed that, although objections to reopening were filed, no independent speaking order disposing of them was issued before completion of reassessment. The mandatory procedural safeguard requiring disposal of such objections before proceeding with reassessment was not satisfied; consideration during reassessment or in a show-cause notice could not substitute for a separate speaking order. This failure affected the assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and could not be cured by restoring the matter for fresh assessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid for want of a prior separate speaking order disposing of the objections and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under sections 80-IB/80-IE is available on interest from staff advances and statutory/bank deposits; (ii) Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustainable; (iii) Whether the short-term capital loss on assignment of partnership interest in an LLP was allowable; (iv) Whether deduction under section 80-IE for the Sikkim unit was allowable; (v) Whether deduction under sections 80-IB/80-IE was available on interest on overdue bills; (vi) Whether the Revenue's challenged MAT adjustments relating to section 14A expenditure, intangible-asset amortisation, interest, software and consultancy expenses were sustainable; (vii) Whether the Debenture Redemption Reserve was deductible in computing book profit; (viii) Whether exempt interest on tax-free bonds could be reduced from book profit despite omission to claim it in the return.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under sections 80-IB/80-IE is available on interest from staff advances and statutory/bank deposits.

Analysis: Consistent decisions in the assessee's earlier years had denied deduction for interest on staff advances and fixed/statutory or bank deposits, as such income was not derived from the eligible undertaking.

Conclusion: Deduction on interest from staff advances and statutory/bank deposits is not allowable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustainable.

Analysis: Investments yielding exempt income had been made in earlier years. Where sufficient interest-free own funds are available, investments are presumed to have been made from those funds and no interest disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) arises. Administrative expenditure remains disallowable at 0.5% of the average value of investments yielding exempt income, after credit for the voluntary disallowance.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for verification of own funds; interest disallowance shall not be made if sufficient own funds are established, while administrative disallowance shall be recomputed, in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (iii): Whether the short-term capital loss on assignment of partnership interest in an LLP was allowable.

Analysis: Partnership rights are capital assets and their assignment is a transfer for capital-gains purposes. However, the transaction involved allegedly related entities, neither side had applied a proper valuation mechanism, and no valuation report for the LLP interest as at transfer was available. The financial statements and accounting consequences of the merger, the LLP accounts, and a valuation based on an approved methodology were required to determine the actual gain or loss.

Conclusion: The allowability and quantum of the capital loss were restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh determination in accordance with law.

Issue (iv): Whether deduction under section 80-IE for the Sikkim unit was allowable.

Analysis: The relief granted followed consistent decisions in the assessee's and predecessor entity's earlier years. The Revenue established neither distinguishing facts nor a change in law.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80-IE for the Sikkim unit is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether deduction under sections 80-IB/80-IE was available on interest on overdue bills.

Analysis: Earlier orders consistently accepted the claim relating to interest on overdue bills, and no basis was shown for departure from that settled factual position.

Conclusion: Deduction on interest on overdue bills is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether the Revenue's challenged MAT adjustments relating to section 14A expenditure, intangible-asset amortisation, interest, software and consultancy expenses were sustainable.

Analysis: The relief granted for the MAT adjustment concerning section 14A expenditure and amortisation of intangibles, and the deletion of disallowances concerning interest, software upgradation and maintenance, and consultancy expenditure, were covered by consistent prior-year orders. No distinguishing facts or legal change was shown.

Conclusion: The challenged additions and disallowances were rightly deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether the Debenture Redemption Reserve was deductible in computing book profit.

Analysis: The amount was statutorily required for redemption of debentures, charged against profits, and reflected in audited accounts. A provision made for redemption of debentures represents a known and ascertained liability rather than a reserve; a procedural presentation in the return could not alter its substantive character.

Conclusion: The Debenture Redemption Reserve is deductible in computing book profit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether exempt interest on tax-free bonds could be reduced from book profit despite omission to claim it in the return.

Analysis: Exempt interest credited to the profit and loss account must be reduced under clause (ii) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2). The limitation on an Assessing Officer entertaining a fresh claim without a revised return does not curtail appellate powers to allow a lawful claim arising from facts on record.

Conclusion: Exempt interest on tax-free bonds is reducible from book profit notwithstanding its omission from the return, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtains consequential relief on the section 14A issue and a fresh determination of the LLP-interest loss, while the Revenue's challenges to the relief granted by the first appellate authority fail.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory tax computation benefit cannot be denied for a procedural omission where its factual and legal prerequisites are established, while a related-party transfer generating capital loss requires proper valuation to ascertain the actual taxable result.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to foreign tax credit for taxes withheld overseas on professional legal services, where the gross foreign receipts were included in taxable income in India and the applicable treaty characterization was contested.

Analysis: The professional receipts from overseas clients, principally Japan, were held to fall within Article 12(4) of the India-Japan DTAA rather than Article 14 governing independent personal services, as Article 14 in that treaty framework applied to individuals. The foreign withholding could therefore not be regarded as unreasonable or incorrectly imposed. The assessee had rendered services abroad, included the gross receipts in its Indian taxable income, furnished Form 67 and authenticated foreign tax-deduction certificates, and claimed credit under the applicable treaty mechanism. No factual dispute existed regarding the foreign receipts or corresponding tax withheld. Rule 128 contained no restriction warranting denial of credit on the stated facts.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to foreign tax credit for overseas taxes withheld against its gross foreign income offered to tax in India; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether website development expenditure qualified for depreciation at 60%; (ii) Whether payment gateway charges paid to banks attracted tax deduction at source as commission or brokerage; (iii) Whether advertisement, marketing and publicity expenditure was capital or revenue expenditure; (iv) Whether payments to a foreign group entity, including ticket-cost reimbursements, attracted disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source.

Issue (i): Whether website development expenditure qualified for depreciation at 60%.

Analysis: The claim was covered by the jurisdictional High Court decision and consistent earlier-year orders allowing depreciation at 60% on software-related website development expenditure.

Conclusion: Depreciation on website development expenditure is allowable at 60%, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payment gateway charges paid to banks attracted tax deduction at source as commission or brokerage.

Analysis: Payment gateway charges represented fees for banking and secure payment-settlement services. The banks did not act as agents in the underlying sale transaction; the arrangement was on a principal-to-principal basis. The jurisdictional High Court decision for the assessee's preceding year governed the issue.

Conclusion: Payment gateway charges are not commission or brokerage attracting deduction under Section 194H, and no disallowance is permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether advertisement, marketing and publicity expenditure was capital or revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The expenditure was incurred in the ordinary course of promoting the business and competing in the market. Consistent earlier-year orders treated such advertising and promotional expenditure as revenue expenditure, notwithstanding any incidental enduring benefit.

Conclusion: The advertisement, marketing and publicity expenditure is revenue expenditure allowable as a deduction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether payments to a foreign group entity, including ticket-cost reimbursements, attracted disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source.

Analysis: The ticket-cost amounts reimbursed on a cost-to-cost basis represented proceeds payable to foreign airlines and were neither claimed as business expenditure nor debited to the assessee's profit and loss account. The identical issue had been resolved in the assessee's favour for the preceding year, and the same reasoning applied.

Conclusion: The payments do not warrant disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions of all disputed additions and disallowances are sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Payments for banking services without an agency relationship are not commission or brokerage for tax-deduction purposes, and cost-to-cost reimbursements not claimed as business expenditure cannot be disallowed as such expenditure for non-deduction of tax.

Issues: Whether DGHS communications subsequently produced warranted review of the order denying customs-duty exemption to a diagnostic centre that did not satisfy the notification conditions.

Analysis: The DGHS communications merely expressed the view that diagnostic centres need not maintain inpatient beds and requested clarification or inclusion of such centres. They did not amend the applicable exemption notifications, whose conditions remained binding and undisputedly unfulfilled. Newly discovered material can justify review only where it is relevant, was unavailable despite due diligence, and is capable of altering the judgment; review jurisdiction cannot be used to re-argue the merits.

Conclusion: The DGHS communications did not justify review, and the review petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the dismissal of the statutory appeal as time-barred warranted setting aside and fresh adjudication on merits.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes the appeal limitation period and permits condonation only within the statutorily fixed outer limit. The appellate order was pronounced on 26.02.2026, communicated with the letter dated 10.03.2026, and uploaded on the departmental website on 17.04.2026. The appeal required fresh determination on merits rather than dismissal on limitation.

Conclusion: The appellate order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation was set aside, and the appeal was remitted for decision afresh on merits.

Issues: Whether the writ petition raising a pure jurisdictional challenge to the competence of the State GST investigation officer to issue the show-cause notice and adjudicate could be entertained despite the available statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Availability of an efficacious alternative remedy ordinarily restrains exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly where appellate forums are functional. However, a writ petition may be entertained where the challenged proceedings are alleged to be wholly without jurisdiction and the objection is a pure question of law not requiring determination of disputed facts. The challenge to the adjudicating authority's competence, including whether an officer of the Bureau of Investigation possessed adjudicatory power under the GST enactments, required determination. The conflicting High Court views on cross-empowerment also reinforced the need for the jurisdictional objections to be considered. An adjudicating authority may rule on its own jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the alternative appellate remedy, and the jurisdictional objections must be decided first by the adjudicating authority before fresh adjudication on the remaining issues.

Issues: (i) Whether the licensing proceedings were vitiated by delayed issuance of the show-cause notice and absence of a post-decisional hearing following suspension; (ii) Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by facilitating misdeclaration of green peas as yellow peas; (iii) Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by failing to exercise due diligence regarding information imparted to its client.

Issue (i): Whether the licensing proceedings were vitiated by delayed issuance of the show-cause notice and absence of a post-decisional hearing following suspension.

Analysis: The offence report reached the licensing authority on 09.07.2025 and the show-cause notice issued on 01.08.2025 was within the prescribed 90-day period. Although a separate post-decisional hearing and order under Regulation 16(2) were not issued after immediate suspension, the subsequent notice, inquiry, written submissions and personal hearing afforded adequate opportunity before the final order.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not invalidated by delay or denial of natural justice.

Issue (ii): Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by facilitating misdeclaration of green peas as yellow peas.

Analysis: The evolving import-policy notifications distinguished yellow peas from other peas and were capable of causing uncertainty. The bills of entry were filed on the basis of the invoice, bill of lading and importer-approved checklist classifying the goods as yellow peas. A Customs Broker cannot be made liable for a mismatch between the documents supplied by the importer and goods found in a full-container-load consignment, absent material establishing knowledge of, collusion in, or facilitation of misdeclaration. The failure of port customs systems and officers to detect the alleged restriction before clearance also supported grant of benefit of doubt.

Conclusion: No violation of Regulation 10(d) was established, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by failing to exercise due diligence regarding information imparted to its client.

Analysis: Regulation 10(e) concerns diligence in respect of information imparted by the Customs Broker to its client. The description and classification were supplied by the importer and reflected in the invoice and bill of lading; no material showed that the Customs Broker imparted incorrect information to the importer. The finding founded on packing lists was therefore unsupported by the facts and did not establish the charged obligation.

Conclusion: No violation of Regulation 10(e) was established, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Revocation of the Customs Broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty lacked a sustainable foundation because the two proved charges were not made out.

Ratio Decidendi: A Customs Broker is not liable under Regulations 10(d) and 10(e) merely for filing declarations based on importer-supplied and importer-approved documents where knowledge, collusion, or imparting of incorrect information is not established.

Issues: Whether redemption fine and penalty could be imposed for alleged misdeclaration arising from excess quantity and enhancement of the assessable value of imported goods.

Analysis: The supplier's invoice and packing list supported the declared quantity, and there was no evidence that the importer had ordered the excess goods or deliberately suppressed their quantity. The valuation adopted by the department was also inconsistent: although a comparable bill of entry reflected a different price, enhancement was made on the basis of assessment practice without specific contemporaneous import data or a stated valuation rule. The authorities had not established misdeclaration attracting confiscation. Further, redemption fine requires a determination of market price and margin of profit; neither was determined on the record.

Conclusion: The alleged excess quantity and enhanced value did not establish misdeclaration under Sections 111(l) or 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962. The redemption fine and penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) were unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether examination-related services supplied to schools for voluntary Olympiad and talent-search examinations qualify for exemption under Entry No. 9(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked; (iii) Whether penalties consequential to the tax demand were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether examination-related services supplied to schools for voluntary Olympiad and talent-search examinations qualify for exemption under Entry No. 9(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST.

Analysis: Entry No. 9(b) exempts services provided to an educational institution in relation to the conduct of examination. Its plain terms do not restrict the exemption to mandatory Board examinations or examinations forming part of the prescribed curriculum. The expression "relating to" has a broad scope and covers activities directly connected with examination, including preparation of question papers, supply of OMR sheets and other examination material, evaluation, tabulation and declaration of results.

Analysis: The schools identified participants, collected and remitted fees, supplied student details, conducted and supervised the tests at their premises, and forwarded answer sheets. The contractual and commercial relationship was therefore between the appellant and the schools; the students' ultimate benefit did not make them recipients of the service. Voluntary participation and promotional features did not alter the essential examination-related character of the services. Subsequent GST payment could not govern taxability under the earlier service-tax regime.

Conclusion: The services were exempt under Entry No. 9(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked.

Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the exemption entry. The appellant maintained regular accounts, disclosed receipts in financial statements and income-tax returns, and supplied information during investigation; the demand was based on its own records. There was no material establishing deliberate concealment, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade tax. Mere non-payment founded on an interpretational position does not establish suppression, particularly where divergent views existed on examination-related services.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties consequential to the tax demand were sustainable.

Analysis: The penalties rested on the alleged suppressed non-payment of service tax. The tax demand failed on merits and the extended period was unavailable. The record also supported a bona fide belief regarding exemption in an interpretational dispute.

Conclusion: Penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, including the penalty on the director, were unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Examination services supplied to educational institutions remain within the exemption notwithstanding that the examinations are optional or outside the prescribed Board curriculum, and no extended-period liability or consequential penal exposure arises on the facts.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption for services relating to conduct of examination by an educational institution covers all services having a direct and proximate nexus with that examination, without importing an unstated requirement that the examination be compulsory or curriculum-based.

Issues: (i) Whether service-tax demand on legal services received under the reverse charge mechanism was sustainable; (ii) Whether penalty for non-payment of such service tax was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether service-tax demand on legal services received under the reverse charge mechanism was sustainable.

Analysis: Legal services supplied by an advocate or a firm of advocates to a business entity were taxable, and the recipient bore the entire tax liability under the reverse charge mechanism. However, the assessee was entitled to avail CENVAT credit of the tax payable on those input legal services for providing taxable output services. Payment of tax and availment of corresponding credit would therefore create a revenue-neutral situation. Applying the settled treatment of revenue neutrality in reverse-charge cases, the demand could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable on account of revenue neutrality, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for non-payment of such service tax was sustainable.

Analysis: Since the underlying service-tax demand was not sustainable, no interest or penalty could survive.

Conclusion: Penalty was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed liability arising from reverse-charge tax on the disputed legal services was annulled, with consequential relief available in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax payable under reverse charge is fully available to the same assessee as CENVAT credit, the resulting revenue-neutrality renders the tax demand and consequential penal liability unsustainable.

Issues: Whether premiums retained on lapse or repudiation of life-insurance policies for non-payment of premium or misdeclaration constitute consideration for a declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The insurance contract became void or lapsed upon the specified defaults, with no surrender value or benefit becoming payable where the policy was not revived. Retention of amounts already paid was an incident of the original insurance arrangement and not a distinct agreement under which the insurer undertook, for consideration, to tolerate a default or situation. A declared service under Section 66E(e) requires an independent contractual obligation specifically covering the act of refraining, tolerating, or doing an act, together with a necessary nexus and flow of consideration for that obligation. Treating the retained premium as consideration for a separate declared service would also result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The retained premiums are not taxable as consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act; the service-tax demand, interest, and penalties are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether CGST authorities could invoke Section 74(1) to deny transitional credit on the basis that CENVAT credit validly carried in pre-GST returns was inadmissible under the erstwhile regime; (ii) Whether Krishi Kalyan Cess credit transitioned under Section 140(1) was admissible; (iii) Whether VAT credit on stock-in-trade transitioned under Section 140(6) could be denied without contrary material or specific findings.

Issue (i): Whether CGST authorities could invoke Section 74(1) to deny transitional credit on the basis that CENVAT credit validly carried in pre-GST returns was inadmissible under the erstwhile regime.

Analysis: Sections 142(6)(a) and 174(2)(e) preserve proceedings and remedies under the erstwhile enactments. The credit in question stood disclosed as closing balance in the pre-GST service-tax and VAT returns and had never been disputed under those laws. Section 140 permits carry-forward subject to GST eligibility conditions, but does not empower CGST officers to reassess the correctness of credit availed under the repealed regime. Verification of closing credit against particular invoices was also untenable because the closing balance is derived from opening balance, availment and utilisation. Proceedings for alleged wrong availment under the erstwhile regime could only be initiated under the applicable erstwhile law.

Conclusion: The Section 74(1) proceedings, insofar as they reassessed the admissibility of pre-GST credit under the erstwhile laws, were without jurisdiction and were decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Krishi Kalyan Cess credit transitioned under Section 140(1) was admissible.

Analysis: Explanation 3 to Section 140 could not be applied to deny cess credit under Section 140(1) in the absence of operationalisation of the linked amendments to Explanations 1 and 2. The departmental circular confirmed that those amendments would not be notified. The jurisdictional High Court ruling governing the effect of these provisions remained operative, and the pending challenge against it did not justify denial in the absence of a stay.

Conclusion: Transition of Krishi Kalyan Cess credit was valid and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether VAT credit on stock-in-trade transitioned under Section 140(6) could be denied without contrary material or specific findings.

Analysis: The required particulars for stock-in-trade VAT credit had been furnished, while the lower authorities recorded no specific defect or evidence disproving eligibility. The denial merely treated this credit as part of other disputed credits. Objections concerning invoice particulars and documents, not raised when the underlying credit was claimed, could not sustain denial at the transition stage.

Conclusion: The transitioned VAT credit on stock-in-trade was eligible and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional credits were legally available, and the demand, interest and penalty founded on their denial could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Transitional-credit provisions do not confer jurisdiction on GST authorities to reassess the admissibility of credit validly carried forward from the erstwhile regime; such disputes must be pursued under the saved provisions of the applicable erstwhile law.

Issues: Whether punitive action against an authorised courier was justified for alleged contravention connected with a consignment containing ingeniously concealed gold.

Analysis: The inquiry findings established that the masterminds of the smuggling had been identified and that no evidence implicated the authorised courier or showed its knowledge of the concealed gold. The declared goods did not disclose the concealment, which could be detected only through Customs X-ray examination; the courier lacked comparable facilities at the stage of receiving the cargo. The courier had acted bona fide and exercised due diligence to secure compliance. The separate proposed penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 had also been dropped.

Conclusion: The authorised courier had not wilfully contravened its regulatory obligations and was not liable to punitive measures under Regulation 14; the finding dropping the proceedings warranted no interference.

Ratio Decidendi: An authorised courier cannot be subjected to punitive action for concealed contraband absent evidence of knowledge, wilful contravention, or failure to exercise due diligence, particularly where the concealment was not reasonably detectable.

Issues: (i) Whether appointment of a liquidator without considering the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was sustainable; (ii) Whether the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 justified bypassing the recommended insolvency professional; (iii) Whether the objection concerning the appellant's Authorisation for Assignment could sustain the appointment; (iv) Whether progress by the incumbent liquidator and the asserted absence of creditor objection warranted refusal of relief.

Issue (i): Whether appointment of a liquidator without considering the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 34 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 treats continuation of the resolution professional as liquidator as the default, subject to the specified grounds for replacement. The unanimous and repeatedly affirmed recommendation of the sole Committee of Creditors member was material to selection of the liquidator. The impugned order referred to the relevant Committee meeting only for fixation of fees and did not acknowledge or address its recommendation of the appellant.

Conclusion: The appointment made without consideration of the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 justified bypassing the recommended insolvency professional.

Analysis: The power under Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits replacement on grounds relating to a particular resolution professional and cannot be transformed into a general exclusion of erstwhile insolvency resolution professionals from appointment as liquidators. In any event, the communication targeting an outgoing interim resolution professional or resolution professional did not apply because the appellant had never held either office in the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The communication did not furnish a valid basis for appointing another liquidator in place of the appellant, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the objection concerning the appellant's Authorisation for Assignment could sustain the appointment.

Analysis: The eligibility objection was not part of the reasoning in the impugned order. The material concerning the appellant's AFA was contested, and the appellate record did not permit a conclusive determination of its validity. Regulation 7A of the IBBI (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016 nevertheless required verification before the appellant assumed charge.

Conclusion: The AFA objection could not sustain the impugned appointment; the appellant's current AFA must be verified by the Adjudicating Authority before assumption of charge.

Issue (iv): Whether progress by the incumbent liquidator and the asserted absence of creditor objection warranted refusal of relief.

Analysis: The incumbent's actions were routine statutory liquidation steps, while realisation of assets had remained stayed shortly after his appointment. Those acts were neither irreversible nor sufficient to override the sole financial creditor's unequivocal, repeated recommendation of the appellant. The completed steps could be adopted by the incoming liquidator, and the incumbent was entitled to appropriate costs and fees for work genuinely performed.

Conclusion: Neither the progress made nor the asserted absence of objection justified retaining the incumbent liquidator, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The liquidator's appointment was required to conform to the unanimously expressed commercial decision of the Committee of Creditors, subject to verification of the proposed liquidator's subsisting regulatory authorisation and preservation of valid steps already undertaken.

Ratio Decidendi: A liquidator cannot be appointed by disregarding a unanimous Committee of Creditors recommendation on the basis of a general communication that is outside the confines of Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or factually inapplicable to the recommended professional.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was leviable on construction and sale of residential flats, substantially undertaken before 01.07.2010, under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was leviable on construction and sale of residential flats, substantially undertaken before 01.07.2010, under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: Composite construction agreements did not contain a statutory mechanism for segregating goods and service components during the relevant period. The settled position concerning builders' construction for prospective purchasers before 01.07.2010 did not permit the proposed levy on composite consideration. The construction was also for individual purchasers' personal use, attracting the exclusion from the meaning of residential complex, supported by the applicable departmental clarification.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand on the construction activity was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The assessee was registered and filed statutory returns, while the dispute arose from an unsettled and interpretational question concerning the taxable entry and departmental clarification. Mere non-payment in those circumstances did not establish deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax. As the substantive demand failed, consequential interest and penalties could not survive; the bona fide interpretational dispute also warranted the statutory penalty protection.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was invalid, and the consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax liability and its consequential fiscal imposts were annulled; payment of the late fee is to be verified and adjusted if established.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite pre-01.07.2010 construction transaction cannot be subjected to the proposed service-tax levy where the legal framework did not provide for segregation of goods and service value; an interpretational dispute without deliberate suppression cannot justify the extended limitation period or penalties.