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Issues: Whether the discharge of the second respondent from prosecution under Section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified on the ground that the notice issued to him did not comply with Section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and, consequently, whether the revision petition warranted interference.
Analysis: The liability sought to be fastened on the second respondent depended on treating him as the principal officer of the company. The Court examined the notice dated 21.10.2018 and found that it only called upon him to explain the non-remittance of tax and did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a proper notice under Section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the foundational requirement for treating him as the principal officer was not established, the Trial Court's view that there was no prima facie material to proceed against him was found to be neither illegal nor perverse. The limited scope of revisional interference was also noted.
Conclusion: The discharge of the second respondent was upheld and the challenge to that order failed.
Final Conclusion: The criminal revision was not entertained, and the order discharging the second respondent from the prosecution was left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory notice necessary to treat a person as the principal officer is not shown to be in compliance with Section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, prosecution of that person along with the company cannot be sustained at the threshold.