Foreign award enforcement remains narrow: Section 48 objections cannot be used for merits review, non-signatory re-litigation, or reasoned damages challenges.

Foreign award enforcement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is confined to the narrow refusal grounds in Section 48, and those grounds cannot be expanded into a merits review. Section 47 is procedural and does not require the award-holder to independently prove, at the enforcement stage, that a non-signatory is bound. Section 48(1)(a) and 48(1)(c) do not permit resistance merely because the respondent says it was never a party or that the tribunal wrongly applied alter ego findings. Section 48(1)(b) does not allow an attack on the adequacy of reasons, and a best-judgment damages assessment is not, by itself, contrary to public policy.

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Issues: (i) Whether, at the enforcement stage of a foreign award, Section 47(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 requires the award-holder to adduce substantive evidence to independently prove that a non-signatory can be bound by the award. (ii) Whether Sections 48(1)(a) and 48(1)(c) permit a non-signatory to resist enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it was never a party to the arbitration agreement or that the award travelled beyond the scope of submission to arbitration. (iii) Whether the award could be refused enforcement on the ground of alleged inadequacy of reasons or breach of natural justice under Section 48(1)(b). (iv) Whether the damages award was unenforceable as being perverse, unsupported by proof, or contrary to public policy under Section 48(2).

Issue (i): Whether, at the enforcement stage of a foreign award, Section 47(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 requires the award-holder to adduce substantive evidence to independently prove that a non-signatory can be bound by the award.

Analysis: Section 47 is procedural and is concerned with production of the foreign award, the arbitration agreement, and such evidence as may be necessary to prove that the award is a foreign award. The provision does not require the enforcing party to lead substantive evidence before the enforcing court to establish, as an independent jurisdictional question, that a non-signatory may be bound. The court emphasised that the burden under Section 47(1)(c) is confined to proving the award's character as a foreign award under Section 44.

Conclusion: The contention that Section 47(1)(c) requires substantive proof of the binding effect of the award on non-signatories was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether Sections 48(1)(a) and 48(1)(c) permit a non-signatory to resist enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it was never a party to the arbitration agreement or that the award travelled beyond the scope of submission to arbitration.

Analysis: The grounds for refusal of enforcement under Section 48 are narrow and must be construed restrictively in light of the Convention's pro-enforcement policy. Section 48(1)(a), on its plain language, concerns incapacity of the parties to the agreement or invalidity of the agreement under the applicable law, and does not extend to a plea by a non-party that it was never bound by the arbitration agreement. Section 48(1)(c) is directed to disputes not contemplated by, or falling outside, the submission to arbitration, and therefore concerns subject-matter excess rather than the question whether a person is a party to the agreement. The award in question applied the alter ego doctrine on facts and reasons found by the tribunal, and the enforcing court would not reappreciate those merits under the guise of Section 48.

Conclusion: The objections under Sections 48(1)(a) and 48(1)(c) failed, and enforcement could not be refused on those grounds.

Issue (iii): Whether the award could be refused enforcement on the ground of alleged inadequacy of reasons or breach of natural justice under Section 48(1)(b).

Analysis: Section 48(1)(b) is confined to defects in notice, appointment of the arbitrator, or inability to present the case. It does not create a separate ground to attack the quality or adequacy of reasons in the award. The tribunal had heard the parties and rendered a reasoned award; even if the reasoning were brief or imperfect, that would not amount to a breach of natural justice within the meaning of the provision. The challenge sought to convert a merits complaint into a natural justice objection, which was impermissible.

Conclusion: The plea based on Section 48(1)(b) was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the damages award was unenforceable as being perverse, unsupported by proof, or contrary to public policy under Section 48(2).

Analysis: The court held that perversity as a merits-based ground cannot be used to refuse enforcement of a foreign award under Section 48, which must remain within the narrow Convention exceptions. The tribunal's assessment of damages was a best-judgment estimate adopted because the appellants' conduct made precise proof difficult. Such an assessment, even if approximate, did not shock the conscience or offend the most basic notions of justice. The public policy defence could not be expanded to permit a review of the merits or the quantum of damages.

Conclusion: The award of damages was upheld and no ground under Section 48(2) was made out.

Final Conclusion: The foreign award was held enforceable against the appellants, and the challenge to enforcement failed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: In enforcement of foreign awards, the resisting party must bring itself strictly within the narrow grounds under Section 48, and those grounds cannot be expanded to permit a merits review, a reappreciation of evidence, or a fresh jurisdictional inquiry into non-signatory liability where the award itself supplies reasoned findings on the relevant facts.

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