Concessional excise levy cannot be enforced before effective communication of policy change; revisional relief cannot rest on unrelated grounds.

A departmental change reducing a concessional compounded excise levy could not be enforced against an assessee for the intervening period until the change was effectively communicated or otherwise brought into operation against it; the demand for 15 May 1972 to 12 July 1972 was therefore not sustainable. For the later period, entitlement to the concession depended on the factual position after excess looms were dismantled, not on separate prior approval from the Textile Commissioner or amendment of the licence, so revisional interference on those grounds was improper and the appellate relief was restored.

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Issues: (i) whether the demand for excise duty for the period between 15 May 1972 and 12 July 1972 could be sustained when the departmental clarification changing the concession was not shown to have been communicated or made public before 12 July 1972; (ii) whether the revisional authority could set aside the appellate relief granted for the period after 12 July 1972 on the grounds that prior permission of the Textile Commissioner had not been obtained and the excise licence had not been amended.

Issue (i): whether the demand for excise duty for the period between 15 May 1972 and 12 July 1972 could be sustained when the departmental clarification changing the concession was not shown to have been communicated or made public before 12 July 1972.

Analysis: The petitioner had been expressly informed by the departmental authority in 1969 that the concessional compounded levy was available notwithstanding the number of looms operated, and it had acted on that representation. The later departmental clarification limiting the concession was not shown to have been published or communicated to the petitioner until 12 July 1972. In these circumstances, the same considerations that required withdrawal of the demand for the earlier period applied to the intervening period as well. A mere date on the clarification was insufficient when the record did not show that the change in policy had actually come into force against the petitioner before it was informed of it.

Conclusion: The demand for the period between 15 May 1972 and 12 July 1972 could not be sustained and was liable to be withdrawn, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the revisional authority could set aside the appellate relief granted for the period after 12 July 1972 on the grounds that prior permission of the Textile Commissioner had not been obtained and the excise licence had not been amended.

Analysis: Entitlement to the compounded levy turned on whether the petitioner was in fact operating within the permissible limit after the excess looms were dismantled, not on whether separate Textile Commissioner approval had been obtained for that course. The appellate authority had rightly accepted the petitioner's position for the later period, and the revisional authority could not lawfully convert the revision into an order adverse to the petitioner on a ground that did not determine the excise concession itself.

Conclusion: The revisional authority was not competent to deny the relief on those grounds, and the appellate relief for the period after 12 July 1972 was restored, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent that the disputed excise demand was curtailed for the intervening period and the assessee retained relief for the later period after it had been apprised of the policy change.

Ratio Decidendi: A departmental change in the basis of levy cannot be enforced against an assessee until it is effectively communicated or otherwise brought into operation against it, and revisional authority cannot withdraw appellate relief on a ground unrelated to the substantive entitlement to the concessional levy.

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