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Issues: Whether the concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 required interference in revision, and whether the sentence of fine imposed was disproportionate and required modification.
Analysis: The accused admitted borrowing the loan amount and issuing the cheques, and the cheques were dishonoured with the endorsement of payment stopped by drawer. These admitted facts attracted the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The defence that the cheques were only security and that the loan had been repaid was not substantiated on a preponderance of probabilities. The materials relied on by the accused did not establish clearance of the very loan in question, especially in view of the evidence showing multiple monetary transactions between the parties. However, while the conviction was sustained, the sentence of fine was found to be on the higher side in the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The conviction was upheld, but the fine was reduced and the compensation correspondingly modified.
Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded only to the limited extent of sentence modification, while the finding of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 remained intact.
Ratio Decidendi: Once issuance of cheque, underlying debt, and dishonour are established, the statutory presumption of liability stands unless rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities; even where conviction is sustained, the sentence must remain proportionate to the gravity of the proven offence.