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Issues: (i) Whether the complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were barred by limitation. (ii) Whether the petitioner, as a former director and signatory of some cheques, could be proceeded against in the complaints and whether the summoning order and refusal to discharge called for interference.
Issue (i): Whether the complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were barred by limitation.
Analysis: The notices of demand were held to have been served on the company within the statutory timeline, and the complaints were instituted thereafter. The Court accepted that service on the company and its responsible directors was sufficient in the facts of the case, and that the complaints had been filed within the prescribed period.
Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner, as a former director and signatory of some cheques, could be proceeded against in the complaints and whether the summoning order and refusal to discharge called for interference.
Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner was a director at the time of the underlying transaction, had signed two cheques, and the complaint contained specific averments regarding his role in the company and the issuance of cheques. It held that the question whether he had resigned before presentation, or whether he was otherwise liable, involved disputed facts and defences that had to be tested at trial. The Court also held that the magistrate was only required to see whether a prima facie case existed at the summoning stage and that the material raised triable issues, making quashing unwarranted.
Conclusion: The petitioner remained liable to face trial and the challenge to the summoning and discharge orders failed.
Final Conclusion: The complaints and the impugned orders were sustained, with the disputed factual defences left open for adjudication in trial.
Ratio Decidendi: At the summoning and quashing stage in a cheque dishonour prosecution, specific averments of the accused's role and cheque-signing capacity are sufficient to proceed, and disputed questions about resignation, control of the company, or other defences must ordinarily be tried rather than decided under inherent jurisdiction.
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