Section 149 limitation turns on issuance, not service, and writ relief may be refused where an effective statutory remedy exists.

Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the word "issued" in section 149 was held to mean the act of issuance and not service of the reassessment notice; on that construction, notices for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 were time-barred and quashed. For the assessment year 1969-70, the Court declined to examine the reassessment objections on merits because an effective statutory remedy was available, and writ jurisdiction was therefore not invoked. The commentary distinguishes section 149 from the 1922 Act scheme considered in earlier authority and confirms that service is separately required under section 148 before reassessment can proceed.

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Issues: (i) whether notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were time-barred under section 149(1)(b) where the case fell under section 147(b), and whether "issued" in that provision meant merely sent or meant served; (ii) whether the writ petition relating to the assessment year 1969-70 was barred by the constitutional restriction against entertaining a petition where an alternative statutory remedy was available.

Issue (i): whether notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were time-barred under section 149(1)(b) where the case fell under section 147(b), and whether "issued" in that provision meant merely sent or meant served.

Analysis: The notices were founded on section 147(b), because the revenue's own case was that the original assessments had not proceeded on the footing of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, but on later information or realization. Under the scheme of the 1961 Act, section 149 fixes the time-limit for the issuance of the notice, while section 148 requires service of the notice before reassessment can proceed. That scheme is materially different from the 1922 Act considered in Banarsi Debi, where the time-limit ran with service, so the wider meaning given to "issued" in that context could not be transplanted into section 149. The expression in section 149 therefore retained its natural meaning, namely issuance and not service.

Conclusion: The notices for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 were beyond limitation and were quashed; the legal meaning of "issued" in section 149 was held to be different from "served".

Issue (ii): whether the writ petition relating to the assessment year 1969-70 was barred by the constitutional restriction against entertaining a petition where an alternative statutory remedy was available.

Analysis: The Court did not enter upon the merits of the contention that the reassessment notice was merely a change of opinion or that there was no adequate reason to believe. It held that, in view of the constitutional bar then applicable, the assessee had an available statutory remedy before the income-tax authorities and appellate fora, and therefore the writ jurisdiction could not be invoked for that assessment year.

Conclusion: The writ petition for the assessment year 1969-70 was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in getting the notices for two assessment years annulled as time-barred, but failed in the writ petition for the remaining year because the Court declined to entertain it in the presence of an alternative remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the word "issued" in section 149 refers to issuance of the notice and not its service, and writ jurisdiction may be declined where an effective statutory remedy is available.

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