Arbitration challenge limitation is strict: delay beyond the statutory ceiling cannot be condoned, even with Limitation Act relief.

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allows an award challenge only within three months of receipt, with a further 30-day extension on sufficient cause, and the words "but not thereafter" make that ceiling absolute. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to extend time beyond that limit. Section 14 may exclude bona fide time spent before a court without jurisdiction, but even after that exclusion the filing remained 131 days late, so administrative difficulty could not justify condonation and the Section 34 application was barred by limitation.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 514 days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could be condoned by applying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, despite the limit prescribed by Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.

Analysis: Section 34(3) permits an application to set aside an arbitral award only within three months from receipt of the award, with a further extension of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown, and the words "but not thereafter" exclude any further enlargement of time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to an application under Section 34, because the statutory scheme makes the limitation under Section 34 absolute beyond the additional thirty days. Section 14 of the Limitation Act can exclude time spent bona fide before a court without jurisdiction, but even after giving that benefit, the respondent still remained beyond the outer statutory limit by 131 days, and administrative difficulties could not justify condonation beyond the period permitted by Section 34(3).

Conclusion: The delay beyond the statutory ceiling could not be condoned, and the application under Section 34 was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 prescribes a fixed limitation period with a further extension of only thirty days and uses the expression "but not thereafter", courts cannot condone delay beyond that outer limit, though Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may be applied only to exclude bona fide time spent in a court without jurisdiction.

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