Special limitation under carriage by air law overrides acknowledgment-based extension, leaving the suit time-barred.

Rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 imposes a special two-year period for bringing claims arising from carriage by air, and that period extinguishes the right to damages if not enforced in time. Because the Act is a later special enactment, Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be used to extend or revive that fixed period, even where an alleged acknowledgement of liability is relied on. The court-law computation rule under the Limitation Act applies only to calculation, not to enlargement of the statutory deadline. The alleged acknowledgement in the reply notice therefore did not save the suit, which was treated as time-barred.

---

---

Issues: Whether the two-year limitation prescribed under Rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 is displaced by Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the basis of an alleged acknowledgement of liability.

Analysis: The Carriage by Air Act, 1972 is a special and later enactment governing claims arising out of carriage by air, while the Limitation Act, 1963 is a general law. Rule 30 of the Second Schedule specifically provides that the right to damages is extinguished if an action is not brought within two years, and the method of calculating limitation is governed by the law of the Court seized of the case only for computation, not for extension of the statutory period. The contractual conditions on the airway bill were also consistent with this special limitation regime. In such a statutory setting, Section 18 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to extend the period fixed by the special enactment. The alleged acknowledgement in the reply notice therefore did not save the suit from being time-barred.

Conclusion: Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was inapplicable, and the suit was barred by limitation under Rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.

---