Revisional remedy under a repealed foreign exchange law was not preserved, and pending revisions were held not maintainable.

Revisional jurisdiction under the repealed foreign exchange law was treated as a statutory remedy, not a vested right. The saving provision in the new enactment preserved only the specific situations it expressly covered, such as pending appeals and identified post-repeal actions, and did not extend to pending or future revision applications under the repealed law. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not preserve the remedy because the legislature had not saved it. Mimansa principles could not revive a remedy that had ceased to exist in law, so the revision applications were not maintainable.

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Issues: Whether revision applications filed after the repeal of the earlier foreign exchange law were maintainable before the Appellate Tribunal, and whether the saving provisions, the General Clauses Act, or Mimansa principles preserved such a remedy.

Analysis: The revisional power under the repealed law was held to be a creature of statute and not a vested right. The saving provision in the new enactment protected only the situations expressly covered, namely pending appeals and specified post-repeal actions, while it did not preserve pending or future revision applications under the repealed law. The general saving rule in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not assist because the legislature had not saved that remedy. Mimansa principles could not revive a remedy that had ceased to exist in law.

Conclusion: The revision applications were not maintainable, and the appeals failed.

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