Vicarious criminal liability requires specific allegations of active involvement; a former director was protected after resignation was documented.

A former director was held not liable to face criminal prosecution where the record showed resignation from the company before the disputed transaction and his name had been removed from company and tax records. The FIR alleged inducement, supply, and non-payment against other accused, but it did not attribute any independent representation, participation, or criminal intent to him. In the absence of a specific statutory basis for vicarious liability, continuation of proceedings against a person with no concrete role in the offence was found unwarranted, and the FIR was quashed as against him.

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Issues: Whether the FIR was liable to be quashed qua the petitioner on the ground that he had resigned from the company before the alleged transaction and no specific role or criminal intent was attributed to him.

Analysis: The petitioner had documentary support showing resignation from the company prior to the complainant's dealings with the concern, and the record also indicated that his name had been removed from the relevant tax and company records. The allegations in the FIR related to the inducement, supply transaction, and non-payment were directed against the other accused persons, while no independent act of representation, inducement, or participation was attributed to the petitioner. In criminal law, vicarious liability cannot be presumed unless the statute expressly provides for it, and in the absence of a specific role or active participation coupled with criminal intent, continuation of prosecution would be unjustified.

Conclusion: The FIR was quashed qua the petitioner; the petition was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A former director cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution on a theory of vicarious liability without a specific statutory basis or concrete allegations showing active involvement and criminal intent in the offence.

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