Speed post service and cross-objection limitation: delivery may be presumed from evidence, and unstated filing limits cannot bar objections.

Service of an adjudication order sent by speed post was treated as duly effected because, although Section 27 of the General Clauses Act presumption applies to registered post, delivery could still be inferred under Section 114 of the Evidence Act from ordinary postal transmission when no rebuttal evidence was produced. Cross-objections were held not to be barred by limitation because the governing statute did not prescribe a fixed filing period, and the appellate authority had itself granted time to file them. The commentary states that cross-objections could not be rejected as time-barred on an unstated limitation period, while the challenge otherwise failed.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether service of the adjudication order sent by speed post could be presumed in the absence of proof of actual delivery, and (ii) whether the cross-objections filed before the appellate authority were barred by limitation.

Issue (i): whether service of the adjudication order sent by speed post could be presumed in the absence of proof of actual delivery.

Analysis: Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 provides the modes of service of orders and deems service upon tender, registered post, or affixture in the prescribed manner. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 raises a statutory presumption only where a document is sent by registered post. Since the order was sent by speed post, that statutory presumption was not directly available. Even so, a presumption of delivery could arise under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 on the ordinary course of postal transmission, and the appellant had to rebut that presumption by evidence. No such rebuttal was produced.

Conclusion: the service of the order sent by speed post was treated as duly effected, and this issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): whether the cross-objections filed before the appellate authority were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The statute governing the appeal did not prescribe a fixed period for filing cross-objections. The appellate authority itself granted time to file them, and the cross-objections were filed within the time so granted and taken on record. In these circumstances, they could not be rejected as time-barred merely by applying a limitation period not found in the statute.

Conclusion: the cross-objections were not barred by limitation, and this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: the challenge succeeded only to the extent of the rejection of the cross-objections, which was set aside and remanded for fresh disposal, while the rest of the appeal did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: where the statute does not prescribe a limitation for cross-objections, an appellate authority cannot reject them as time-barred despite having granted time to file them; and service by speed post may still be presumed from surrounding evidence if the addressee fails to rebut delivery.

---