Limited scrutiny under section 33(2)(b) bars reappraisal of domestic enquiry evidence and approval cannot be refused on merits.

Under section 33(2)(b), the approving authority's inquiry is limited to whether the statutory conditions are met, a proper domestic enquiry was held, and a prima facie case exists; it cannot reappraise evidence or sit in appeal over the employer's findings unless the result is wholly unsupported by legal evidence or tainted by victimisation or unfair labour practice. Applying that standard, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting approval on the merits of the domestic enquiry. The dismissal of Har Prasad was also not shown to be victimisation, as the material supported the charge and no protected-workman status was established.

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Issues: (i) Whether, on an application for approval under section 33(2)(b), the industrial authority can reappraise the evidence and go into the merits of the domestic enquiry beyond examining whether the statutory conditions are satisfied; (ii) Whether the dismissal of Har Prasad was vitiated by victimisation or absence of legal justification.

Issue (i): Whether, on an application for approval under section 33(2)(b), the industrial authority can reappraise the evidence and go into the merits of the domestic enquiry beyond examining whether the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguishes between prior permission under section 33(1) and approval under section 33(2)(b). In matters falling under section 33(2)(b), the authority's enquiry is confined to whether the employer has acted in accordance with the standing orders, whether one month's wages have been paid, whether an application for approval has been made, and whether a proper domestic enquiry has been held. If the enquiry is regular and there is material to support a prima facie case, the authority cannot sit in appeal over the findings, assess adequacy of evidence, or substitute its own view on the merits unless the finding is wholly unsupported by legal evidence or reveals victimisation or unfair labour practice.

Conclusion: The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in reappraising the evidence and refusing approval on merits; the finding against the workmen could not be upset on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether the dismissal of Har Prasad was vitiated by victimisation or absence of legal justification.

Analysis: Har Prasad had led the deputation, had issued a warning to the management, and the sequence of events connected his conduct with the later assault on the officers. The domestic enquiry had held the charge proved and there was no protected-workman status. On that material, the dismissal could not be treated as victimisation, and the Tribunal had no authority to reject the employer's action by reassessing the merits of the evidence.

Conclusion: The dismissal of Har Prasad was not shown to be victimisation and approval could not be refused on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The order of the Tribunal was set aside and approval to the employer's action was restored, with the appeal succeeding in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Under section 33(2)(b), the approving authority has a limited supervisory jurisdiction confined to the statutory requirements and the existence of a prima facie case after a proper domestic enquiry, and it cannot act as an appellate forum on the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence.

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