Appeal pendency and limited stay do not defeat decree finality or bar insolvency notice on an executable money decree.

Pendency of an appeal does not, by itself, destroy the finality of a decree, and a limited Supreme Court stay confined to dispossession does not bar statutory proceedings based on the executable part of that decree. Here, the liability for mesne profits remained executable as a money decree, so notice under section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 could validly issue. The court also held that any concern about damage to the respondent's public image was irrelevant under the statute. The order setting aside the insolvency notice was therefore unsustainable, and the appellants were entitled to costs.

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Issues: Whether the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court and an interim stay of dispossession prevented issuance of notice under section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, on the footing that the decree had lost finality.

Analysis: Mere filing of an appeal does not destroy the finality of a decree. The stay granted by the Supreme Court was confined to dispossession, while the liability to pay mesne profits, being in the nature of a money decree, remained executable. The consideration that issuance of insolvency notice might affect the respondent's image in public was not a relevant factor under the statute.

Conclusion: The pendency of the appeal and the limited stay did not bar issuance of notice under section 9(2), and the order setting aside the insolvency notice was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the appellants were held entitled to costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Pendency of an appeal does not by itself destroy the finality of a decree, and a limited stay of execution does not prevent statutory proceedings based on the executable portion of the decree where the statute's conditions are otherwise satisfied.

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