Proof of demand in corruption cases may be inferred from surrounding evidence, but conflicting precedent has sent the issue to a larger Bench.

A conflict in precedent is identified on whether demand and culpability in a corruption prosecution can be inferred from circumstantial evidence when the complainant is unavailable, hostile, or dead and direct proof is lacking. The discussion contrasts authorities requiring direct proof of demand with decisions accepting surrounding circumstances, panch witness testimony, recovery of tainted money, and the statutory presumption. The Court did not decide the merits and instead referred the question for consideration by a larger Bench, leaving the evidentiary standard unresolved pending that review.

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Issues: Whether, in the absence of direct or primary evidence from the complainant, inferential deduction of demand and culpability in a corruption prosecution can be drawn from other evidence.

Analysis: The appeal raised a conflict between earlier decisions on the necessity of direct proof of demand and decisions permitting proof through surrounding circumstances, panch witness testimony, recovery of tainted money, and the statutory presumption. The Court noted that where the complainant is unavailable, hostile, or dead, direct evidence may not be forthcoming, and the question whether guilt can still be inferred from the remaining evidence required reconsideration in light of the existing line of authorities.

Conclusion: The Court did not finally resolve the issue on merits and held that the question should be placed before a larger Bench.

Final Conclusion: The judgment records a judicial disagreement on the evidentiary standard for proving demand in corruption cases and directs that the issue be considered by a larger Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Court finds a substantive conflict in precedent on a legal issue central to the decision, it may refer the question to a larger Bench instead of finally settling the merits.

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