2022 (12) TMI 1490 - SC - Indian Laws

Public servant corruption convictions possible through circumstantial evidence under Prevention of Corruption Act Section 20 presumption

The SC held that in corruption cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, culpability of public servants can be established through inferential ... Illegal gratification - Culpability/guilt of public servant - relevant evidences - proof of demand - Presumption of law - scope of expressions 'may presume', 'shall presume' and 'presumptions of mixed law and fact' - Circumstantial Evidence - hostile witness - Whether, in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution? HELD THAT:- The cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given are stated in Section 65 of the Evidence Act read with Section 66, Section 67(2), Section 78. Proof of documents, whether public or private, including execution of such documents etc. Section 20 of the Act deals with presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. It uses the expression “shall be presumed” in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) unless the contrary is proved. The said provision deals with a legal presumption which is in the nature of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former part of the Section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing a legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act is that during trial, it should be proved that the accused had accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The Section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. In STATE OF MADRAS VERSUS A. VAIDYANATHA IYER [1957 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT], it was observed that the presumption under Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act which is similar to Section 20 of the Act under consideration would arise where illegal gratification has been accepted, then the presumption introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused. The legislature has used the words “shall presume” and not “may presume” which means that the presumption has to be raised as it is a presumption of law and therefore it is obligatory on the court to raise this presumption. Further, the presumptions of law constitute a branch of jurisprudence unlike a case of presumption of fact which is discretionary. The conclusive proof gives an artificial probative effect by the law to certain facts. No evidence is allowed to be produced with a view to combat that effect. When a statute makes certain facts final and conclusive, evidence to disprove such facts is not to be allowed. Circumstantial Evidence - hostile witness - HELD THAT:- This Court cautioned that even if a witness is treated as “hostile” and is cross-examined, his evidence cannot be written off altogether but must be considered with due care and circumspection and that part of the testimony which is creditworthy must be considered and acted upon. It is for the judge as a matter of prudence to consider the extent of evidence which is creditworthy for the purpose of proof of the case. In other words, the fact that a witness has been declared “hostile” does not result in an automatic rejection of his evidence. Even, the evidence of a “hostile witness” if it finds corroboration from the facts of the case may be taken into account while judging the guilt of the accused. Thus, there is no legal bar to raise a conviction upon a “hostile witness” testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. Thus, there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B. JAYARAJ VERSUS STATE OF A.P. [2014 (3) TMI 1104 - SUPREME COURT] and P. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY VERSUS THE DIST. INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ORS. [2015 (9) TMI 1666 - SUPREME COURT] with the three judge Bench decision in N. NARSINGA RAO VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [2000 (12) TMI 892 - SUPREME COURT], with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. The question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as:- In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Issues Involved:1. Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.2. Admissibility of circumstantial evidence in proving demand and acceptance.3. Applicability of legal presumptions under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.4. Handling cases where the complainant is unavailable, hostile, or deceased.5. Interpretation of 'hostile witness' under Section 154 of the Evidence Act.Detailed Analysis:1. Proof of Demand and Acceptance of Illegal Gratification:The judgment emphasizes that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant is a sine qua non to establish guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution must first prove the demand of illegal gratification and subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact, which can be done through direct evidence (oral or documentary). Mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without proof of demand does not constitute an offense under these sections.2. Admissibility of Circumstantial Evidence:The judgment clarifies that in the absence of direct evidence, the fact of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain of events pointing to the guilt of the accused, leaving no reasonable doubt. The court can rely on factual presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence.3. Applicability of Legal Presumptions under Section 20:Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act mandates the court to raise a legal presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward if the condition of acceptance or agreement to accept gratification is proved. This presumption is rebuttable. However, Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The presumption in law under Section 20 is distinct from a presumption of fact, which is discretionary.4. Handling Cases Where the Complainant is Unavailable, Hostile, or Deceased:The judgment addresses scenarios where the complainant is unavailable, hostile, or deceased. It states that the trial does not abate, nor does it result in an acquittal of the accused public servant. The prosecution can prove the case through the evidence of other witnesses or circumstantial evidence. The evidence of a hostile witness can still be considered by the court to the extent it supports the prosecution's case.5. Interpretation of 'Hostile Witness' under Section 154 of the Evidence Act:The judgment discusses the interpretation of 'hostile witness' under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. It clarifies that a witness who does not support the prosecution's case cannot be automatically discarded. The court must consider the evidence of such a witness with due care and circumspection and rely on the part of the testimony that is creditworthy. The evidence of a hostile witness, if corroborated by other reliable evidence, can still form the basis for a conviction.Conclusion:The Constitution Bench concluded that in the absence of direct or primary evidence of the complainant, it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. The judgment underscores the importance of proving the foundational facts through relevant evidence and the role of legal and factual presumptions in corruption cases.