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Issues: (i) whether the appellant's challenge was barred by Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) whether the trial court was justified in refusing to summon the decoding register and related witnesses under Sections 311 and 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): whether the appellant's challenge was barred by Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 301 restricts a private pleader's role in conducting a prosecution, but it does not prevent the State from moving an application or a victim from pursuing a grievance where the prosecution itself has acted. The application for summoning the witness and producing the decoding register was filed by the State. The bar under Section 301 therefore had no application.
Conclusion: The challenge was not barred by Section 301 and the appellant was entitled to pursue the appeal.
Issue (ii): whether the trial court was justified in refusing to summon the decoding register and related witnesses under Sections 311 and 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 311 confers wide power on the Court to summon or recall witnesses at any stage, and the decisive test is whether the evidence is essential to a just decision. Section 91 separately empowers production of documents or things necessary or desirable for the proceeding. The decoding register was shown to be relevant to decode tower-location codes in the call records, and the witness testimony had already disclosed its importance. Closure of evidence was not an absolute bar, and the application was not shown to be an abuse of process or an attempt to introduce irrelevant material. The refusal by the courts below rested on considerations extraneous to the statutory tests.
Conclusion: The refusal to summon the decoding register and the supporting witnesses was unsustainable and the application ought to have been allowed.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, the prosecution's application for production of the decoding registers and summoning of the relevant cellular company witnesses was allowed, and the trial was directed to be concluded within the stipulated time.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court may invoke Sections 311 and 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at any stage to secure material evidence necessary for a just decision, and closure of prosecution evidence does not by itself bar such summoning where the evidence is essential to discover the truth.