Employee dismissed under disciplinary clauses cannot claim reinstatement after criminal acquittal when dismissal wasn't conviction-based

The Calcutta HC dismissed an appeal seeking service reinstatement following criminal acquittal. The appellant was removed from service under disciplinary clauses 1, 5, 6, 11, and 12, not due to criminal conviction. The court held that clause 3, which deals with conviction-related dismissals, was inapplicable since the appellant was never convicted. Therefore, subsequent criminal acquittal could not form the basis for reinstatement. The Division Bench erred in applying clause 3 and granting benefits under sub-clause (d). The writ petition was properly dismissed but for incorrect reasons.

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Issues Involved:
1. Difference of opinion between Division Bench judges regarding the impact of criminal acquittal on disciplinary proceedings.
2. Applicability of clause 3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement to the appellant's case.
3. Standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings versus criminal proceedings.
4. The procedural correctness of the reference made to the referee judge.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Difference of opinion between Division Bench judges regarding the impact of criminal acquittal on disciplinary proceedings:
The Division Bench judges had differing views on whether the appellant's acquittal in a criminal case should affect the disciplinary proceedings. One judge believed that the acquittal should lead to reinstatement, while the other maintained that the standards of proof in criminal and disciplinary proceedings are different, and thus the disciplinary action should stand.

2. Applicability of clause 3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement to the appellant's case:
Clause 3(d) was central to the appellant's argument for reinstatement. This clause pertains to the reinstatement of an employee who has been acquitted after being convicted of an offense. However, the referee judge clarified that clause 3(d) applies only to cases where an employee was dismissed based on a criminal conviction. Since the appellant was removed based on disciplinary proceedings and not a criminal conviction, clause 3(d) was deemed inapplicable.

3. Standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings versus criminal proceedings:
The judgment emphasized the distinction between the standards of proof required in criminal and disciplinary proceedings. Criminal proceedings require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas disciplinary proceedings rely on the preponderance of probabilities. This distinction justified the disciplinary authority's decision to remove the appellant despite his acquittal in the criminal case.

4. The procedural correctness of the reference made to the referee judge:
The appellant's counsel argued that the reference was incompetent as the Division Bench judges did not clearly formulate the point of difference. The referee judge, however, found the difference of opinion to be clear from the records and proceeded to render an opinion. The referee judge cited precedents to support the approach of determining the appeal based on the clear and ascertainable differences in the judges' conclusions.

Conclusion:
The referee judge concluded that the appellant's writ petition deserved dismissal, not because of the reasons assigned by the Single Judge or the companion Judge of the Division Bench, but because clause 3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement did not apply to the appellant's case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's writ petition stood dismissed as well.

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