Revocable licence and settled possession principles bar injunction where permissive occupation lacks legal possession.

A compromise decree creating a licensor-licensee relationship remained a revocable licence, because the absence of a fixed term or express termination clause did not make it irrevocable; the surrounding terms preserved the owner's possession and control. The person using the premises on permissive terms, with keys kept at reception and payment on a daily tariff basis, was not in settled possession and had only a right of use, not legal possession. Once the licence was revoked, protection by injunction was unavailable, and the occupant's remedy was limited to a reasonable time to vacate under the Indian Easements Act, 1882.

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Issues: (i) whether the leave and licence arrangement created by the compromise decree was irrevocable in the absence of an express termination clause; (ii) whether a person occupying premises as a revocable licensee, and not in settled possession, could obtain an injunction restraining the owner from dispossessing it.

Issue (i): whether the leave and licence arrangement created by the compromise decree was irrevocable in the absence of an express termination clause.

Analysis: The terms of the compromise decree showed a clear licensor-licensee relationship and not a lease or tenancy. The absence of a fixed period or an express termination clause did not, by itself, make the licence irrevocable. Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 is not exhaustive, and an agreement may make a licence irrevocable by express or implied terms, but the surrounding terms here showed the contrary. The earlier claim of tenancy was consciously abandoned, and the recorded terms preserved the owner's legal possession and control of the rooms. On that construction, the arrangement remained a revocable licence.

Conclusion: The licence was revocable and not irrevocable or perpetual.

Issue (ii): whether a person occupying premises as a revocable licensee, and not in settled possession, could obtain an injunction restraining the owner from dispossessing it.

Analysis: The protection against forcible dispossession available to a person in settled possession does not extend to a claimant who is merely allowed permissive use and who is not shown to be in possession in the legal sense. The decree required the keys to be kept at reception, payment was on daily tariff basis, and legal possession as well as overall control remained with the owner. The plaintiff therefore had only a right to use the rooms, not possession. The line of authorities protecting settled possession and restraining self-help did not assist a person who was never in settled possession. Once the licence was revoked, the plaintiff's remedy was limited to a reasonable time to vacate under Section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, and no injunction could be granted to perpetuate the occupation.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction against dispossession, and the defendants were entitled to withdraw the status quo undertaking.

Final Conclusion: The application for injunction failed, the challenge to revocation of the undertaking did not survive, and the order granted relief to the defendants while denying protective relief to the plaintiff.

Ratio Decidendi: A permissive occupier whose arrangement is a revocable licence and who is not in settled possession cannot invoke equitable injunction to restrain the owner from asserting possession; protection against dispossession by due process applies only where possession in the legal or settled sense is established.

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