Private complainant may challenge acquittal under Article 136 when evidence appraisal is perverse and justice requires intervention.

Article 136 permits a private complainant to seek special leave against an acquittal because the power is plenary and may be invoked in exceptional cases to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly treated an unrelated injury as an unexplained circumstance and perversely rejected the dying declarations and trustworthy eye-witness evidence; once that evidence was accepted, the acquittal could not stand and the murder conviction was restored against the first accused.

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Issues: (i) whether a private complainant could invoke Article 136 against a High Court acquittal; (ii) whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution case by treating the injury to Ramalingam as unexplained and by disbelieving the dying declarations and eye-witnesses; (iii) whether the conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code could be restored.

Issue (i): whether a private complainant could invoke Article 136 against a High Court acquittal.

Analysis: Article 136 confers plenary appellate power on the Supreme Court and does not confer or restrict any personal right of appeal. The power may be exercised in exceptional cases to prevent miscarriage of justice, and its invocation is not confined to the State. A private party may therefore seek special leave against an acquittal where the interests of justice so require.

Conclusion: The answer is in the affirmative.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution case by treating the injury to Ramalingam as unexplained and by disbelieving the dying declarations and eye-witnesses.

Analysis: The unexplained injury to Ramalingam was held to be an irrelevant circumstance because there was no reliable material connecting him with the same transaction as the deceased. The Court found that the supposed inconsistency was a red herring and that the High Court had ignored the context in which the two dying declarations were recorded. The shorter declaration was recorded when the injured man was in a much worse condition, explaining the absence of details. The testimony of the direct witnesses, except one whose conduct made him doubtful, was found trustworthy, and the High Court's rejection of that evidence was treated as perfunctory and perverse.

Conclusion: The answer is in the negative.

Issue (iii): whether the conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code could be restored.

Analysis: Once the dying declarations and the reliable eye-witness evidence were accepted, the acquittal could not stand. The materials consistently fixed the fatal stabbing on the first accused and supported the trial court's conclusion that the offence of murder was made out.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence for murder were restored against the first accused.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the trial court's conviction for murder was reinstated, with the appeal succeeding on the merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal under Article 136, the Supreme Court may interfere with an acquittal at the instance of a private party where the High Court's appreciation of evidence is perverse or results in miscarriage of justice, and reliable dying declarations together with credible eye-witness testimony can sustain restoration of conviction.

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