Continuing right to seek probate excludes limitation under Article 137 where no fixed accrual date can be identified.

Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is treated as a residuary provision of wide amplitude and can extend beyond applications under the Code of Civil Procedure to petitions under special enactments. In probate matters, however, the right to seek probate or letters of administration is continuing so long as the will remains unprobated, so no definite starting point for limitation can be fixed. On that reasoning, the note states that no limitation period bars a probate petition under Article 137 where the right to apply accrues from day to day.

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Issues: Whether an application for grant of probate or letters of administration is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, if so, whether such an application is barred by limitation.

Analysis: Article 137 is a residuary provision of wider amplitude than the corresponding provision under the earlier Limitation Act, and its wording and placement indicate that it is not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The definition of "application" under the Limitation Act, 1963 supports its application to petitions under special laws. However, in probate matters, the right to apply is of a continuing character so long as the will remains unprobated. Since the right to seek probate accrues from day to day, no fixed starting point for limitation can be identified.

Conclusion: Article 137 applies generally to applications under special enactments, but an application for probate or letters of administration is not governed by any period of limitation and is not barred as time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The objection based on limitation failed, and the probate application was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the right to apply is continuing and no definite point of accrual can be fixed, no period of limitation under Article 137 can be applied to a probate petition.

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