Election process immunity under Article 329(b) limits interim writ interference absent a prima facie case of mala fides or illegality.

Article 329(b) bars judicial intervention once the electoral process has commenced where the relief would call in question an election or obstruct, stall, or protract the proceedings. Judicial review of election action is not entirely excluded, however, and may extend to settled grounds such as mala fide exercise of power, arbitrariness, or breach of law, including limited intervention that merely facilitates the process or preserves evidence. Applying these principles, the challenge to the Election Commission's notification for mixed counting under Rule 59A rested only on a bald allegation of mala fides, while the Commission had statutory power to issue it. The alleged non-publication in the Gazette was found incorrect, and no prima facie basis existed for interim interference during the pending election.

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Issues: Whether the High Court could, after commencement of the electoral process, entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and issue interim directions affecting the manner of counting of votes, and whether the Election Commission's notification issued under Rule 59A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 could be interdicted on the ground of mala fides.

Analysis: Article 329(b) bars judicial intervention where the relief sought would call in question an election or would interrupt, obstruct, protract, or stall the election proceedings. The election process is understood broadly, from the issuance of the election notification until declaration of the result. At the same time, judicial review is not wholly excluded: action of the Election Commission remains open to review on settled grounds such as mala fide exercise of power, arbitrariness, or breach of law. A limited intervention may also be justified where it merely facilitates the election, removes an obstacle, or preserves vital evidence without delaying the process. Applying these principles, the Court found that the challenge before the High Court rested on a bald allegation of mala fides and that the Election Commission had statutory power to issue the notification for mixed counting under Rule 59A. The finding that the notification had not been published in the Gazette was incorrect, and no prima facie case for interference during the pending election was made out.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have granted the interim order. The election Commission's notification could not be interdicted in the circumstances, and the appeals were allowed.

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