Procedural discharge amendment and customs sanction rules: pending cases need the statutory condition to survive, and substance prevails over wording.

A procedural amendment conferring discharge under Section 245(3) CrPC was treated as applicable to pending warrant cases only while its statutory precondition remained unmet; because prosecution evidence before charge had already been completed when the amendment came into force, no discharge benefit arose. On sanction, prior sanction under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act was held valid where the competent authority had approved prosecution on the facts, even though the order used language referring to filing a complaint or prosecution; no particular form of wording was required. The criminal proceeding was therefore not liable to be quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the newly inserted Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to the pending warrant case and entitled the accused to discharge. (ii) Whether the sanction granted under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was invalid because it was worded as sanction for prosecution and not expressly as sanction for taking cognizance.

Issue (i): Whether the newly inserted Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to the pending warrant case and entitled the accused to discharge.

Analysis: The amendment was treated as a procedural and beneficial provision intended to reduce delay and was held applicable to pending warrant cases, but only where, on the date it came into force, the statutory condition for its operation still existed, namely that all evidence before charge had not been completed. On the record, the prosecution evidence before charge had already been concluded before the amendment became operative, and the matter had merely been adjourned for consideration of charge. In those circumstances, no accrued right to discharge arose in favour of the accused under the amended provision.

Conclusion: The accused was not entitled to discharge under Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (ii): Whether the sanction granted under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was invalid because it was worded as sanction for prosecution and not expressly as sanction for taking cognizance.

Analysis: The legal requirement under the Customs Act is a prior sanction of the competent authority before the Court takes cognizance, and no particular form of sanction is prescribed. The sanction order in question set out the facts constituting the alleged offences and was expressly issued in exercise of powers under Section 137(1). The wording that it was granted for filing a complaint did not, by itself, make the sanction invalid, since the substance of the order satisfied the statutory requirement. The Court declined to follow the contrary view taken in the single-judge decision relied upon by the petitioner.

Conclusion: The sanction under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was valid and the cognizance taken on its basis was not illegal.

Final Conclusion: No ground for quashing the criminal proceeding was made out, and the petition was rejected with a direction for expeditious disposal of the case by the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural amendment conferring a discharge benefit applies to pending cases only while the statutory precondition for its operation continues to exist, and a sanction for cognizance under a fiscal statute is valid if the competent authority has granted prior sanction on the facts, even if the order uses the language of sanction for prosecution.

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